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REGULATING PHYSICIAN SPEECH*
CARL H. COLEMAN**
Lawmakers have increasingly sought to shape communications
between physicians and patients by enacting laws that either
mandate or prohibit the provision or solicitation of particular
information. Some of these laws can be justified as efforts to
protect patients by enforcing accepted standards of medical
practice, but others are grounded in medical positions that are
the subject of substantial dispute among expert physicians or that
even flatly contradict an established consensus within the medical
community. The Supreme Court has never articulated a clear
legal standard applicable to governmental efforts to control
physicians’ communications with patients. In the absence of such
guidance, lower courts have adopted a hodgepodge of
approaches, none of which is entirely satisfactory. The purpose
of this Article is to fill this gap by articulating a coherent
approach to the judicial review of laws regulating physicianpatient communications. This Article rejects the two primary
approaches that have been proposed in the literature—applying
strict scrutiny to all laws regulating physician-patient
communications, on the one hand, or applying varying forms of
heightened scrutiny (either strict or intermediate) to limited
categories of communications, on the other. Instead, it proposes
that courts should apply intermediate scrutiny to all laws
interfering with any aspect of physician-patient communications.
However, rather than simply looking at any interest asserted by
the government and then deciding whether it is “important,”
courts applying intermediate scrutiny should ask whether laws
interfering with physician speech are reasonably related to the
specific governmental interest in upholding the quality of
professional practice. The assessment of whether a law is
consistent with this standard should generally be decided with
reference to the views of the professional community; however,
contrary to other commentators, this Article argues that
lawmakers should not be required to defer to the professional
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community’s views in all situations. This Article applies this
standard to a variety of laws interfering with physician-patient
communications, concluding that some of them can be justified
while others cannot.
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INTRODUCTION
The practice of medicine, at its heart, is a communicative
endeavor. Many medical interventions are purely communicative,
ranging from talk therapy for mental illnesses to counseling about
dietary and lifestyle changes for patients with coronary heart disease.
Even when physicians prescribe drugs or perform medical
procedures, they are expected to first engage the patient in a
conversation to identify symptoms and risk factors, assess available
treatment options, and determine the appropriate course of care in
light of the patient’s values and goals.1 A growing body of literature
recognizes that the manner in which physicians engage in these
conversations has a significant impact on patient outcomes.2
Increasingly, lawmakers have sought to shape communications
between physicians and patients by enacting laws that either mandate
1. See infra text accompanying notes 77–78.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 247–50.
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or prohibit the provision or solicitation of particular information. For
example, statutes in some states require physicians to inform
terminally ill patients about the availability of palliative care,3 disclose
specific information to patients undergoing hysterectomies4 or
treatment for breast cancer,5 and tell women if mammogram results
reveal the presence of dense breast tissue.6 More controversially,
several states have enacted mandatory disclosure laws in the context
of abortion, some of which require physicians to make highly disputed
factual assertions, such as a statement that abortion is linked to an
“increased risk of suicide ideation and suicide.”7 At the other end of
the spectrum are laws that prohibit physicians from engaging in
particular types of communications with patients, including
prohibitions on recommending the use of medical marijuana,8 making
routine inquiries about firearm ownership,9 or engaging in talk
therapy designed to change minors’ sexual orientation.10
Some of these laws can be justified as efforts to protect patients
by enforcing accepted standards of medical practice. For example,
research shows that efforts to change minors’ sexual orientation are
not only ineffective but also create a risk of psychological harm.11
3. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 442.5 (West 2016); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW § 2997-c (McKinney 2015).
4. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2496 (McKinney 2012).
5. See Rachael Andersen-Watts, The Failure of Breast Cancer Informed Consent
Statutes, 14 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 201, 211 n.65 (2008) (citing twenty-two state statutes
requiring physicians to disclose specific breast cancer treatment options).
6. See ARE YOU DENSE ADVOCACY, INC., HANDY GUIDE TO STATE DENSITY
REPORTING LAWS (2018), https://www.areyoudenseadvocacy.org/application/files/3815/
3010/0865/STATE_REPORTING_LAWS_6.26.18FIN.pdf [https://perma.cc/FA6C-W7FM].
Other mandatory disclosure laws require physicians to inform pregnant women of the
drugs expected to be delivered during pregnancy and childbirth, N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§ 2503 (McKinney 2012), to provide standardized information to patients undergoing
procedures involving the use of collagen or silicone, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 2259(a),
2259.5(a) (West 2012), to disclose specific risks to patients considering electroconvulsive
treatment, COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-401(4)(d) (Lexis through 2018 Legis. Sess.), and to
provide specific information to individuals undergoing genetic testing, see Kayte SpectorBagdady et al., Analysis of State Laws on Informed Consent for Clinical Genetic Testing in
the Era of Genomic Sequencing, 178 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 81, 83–84 (2018) (reviewing
state statutes).
7. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds (Rounds II), 686 F.3d 889, 894
(8th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
8. See infra text accompanying note 79.
9. See infra notes 119–20 and accompanying text.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 94–102.
11. See generally AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, REPORT OF THE AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON APPROPRIATE THERAPEUTIC
RESPONSES TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION (2009), https://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/
therapeutic-response.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Q6K-SYEK] (concluding that efforts to
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Laws banning this practice are arguably comparable to prohibitions
on the use of dangerous and ineffective drugs. Other laws, however,
are grounded in medical positions that are the subject of substantial
dispute among expert physicians12 or that even flatly contradict an
established consensus within the medical community.13
The Supreme Court has never articulated a clear legal standard
applicable to governmental efforts to control physicians’
communications with patients. In the absence of such guidance, lower
courts have adopted a hodgepodge of approaches, none of which is
entirely satisfactory. Some courts have suggested that, in light of the
government’s role in regulating the medical profession, physicians’
communications with their patients are entitled to no First
Amendment protection.14 Others have subjected restrictions on
physicians’ speech to heightened First Amendment scrutiny but with
inconsistent rationales and disparate outcomes.15 Among both courts
and commentators, there remains substantial disagreement over not
only the standard to apply in these cases but also the types of state
interests that legitimately can be taken into account.
The purpose of this Article is to articulate a coherent approach
to judicial review of laws regulating physicians’ communications with
their patients. Part I examines existing case law concerning
regulations of physician-patient communications, demonstrating that
the Supreme Court’s approach to the issue remains unsettled and that
lower courts have applied inconsistent theories with irreconcilable
results. Part II considers the appropriate standard of review to apply
in these cases. It rejects the two primary approaches that have been
proposed in the literature—applying strict scrutiny to all laws
regulating physician-patient communications, on the one hand, or
applying varying forms of heightened scrutiny (either strict or
intermediate) to limited categories of communications, on the other.
Instead, it proposes that intermediate scrutiny should be applied to all
change sexual orientation are unlikely to be successful and involve some risk of
psychological harm).
12. For example, physicians disagree about the appropriateness of recommending
marijuana as a therapeutic option. See, e.g., Elin Kondrad & Alfred Reid, Colorado
Family Physicians’ Attitudes Toward Medical Marijuana, 26 J. AM. BOARD FAM. MED. 52,
53–55 (2013).
13. See infra note 119 and accompanying text (noting medical professionals’ support
for routinely asking patients whether they have firearms in their homes).
14. See, e.g., Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 233 (1985) (White, J., concurring);
Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195, 1226 (11th Cir. 2014), vacated on reh’g,
797 F.3d 859 (11th Cir. 2015), vacated on reh’g, 814 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2015), aff’d in part
and rev’d in part en banc, 848 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017).
15. See infra Section II.B.
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laws interfering with any aspect of physician-patient communications.
Part III provides greater detail on how intermediate scrutiny should
be applied in physician speech cases. It argues that, rather than simply
looking at any interest asserted by the government and then deciding
whether it is “important,” courts applying intermediate scrutiny
should ask whether laws interfering with physician speech are
substantially related to the specific governmental interest in
upholding the quality of professional practice. It further argues that
courts should assess whether a law is consistent with this standard
with reference to the views of the professional community. Contrary
to other commentators, however, it argues that lawmakers should not
be required to defer to the professional community’s views in all
situations. Part III ends by applying this standard to a variety of laws
interfering with physician-patient communications, concluding that
some of them can be justified while others cannot.
I. EXISTING CASE LAW
When physicians speak to the public—for example, by giving a
speech at a conference or writing a letter to the editor of a
newspaper—there is little dispute that they are entitled to the same
First Amendment protections afforded any other speaker.16 Likewise,
courts have rejected the argument that professional advertising is
exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.17 Thus, restrictions on
advertising by physicians are subject to the same standards applicable
to any other regulations of commercial speech.
However, there is far less clarity regarding the appropriate
standard to apply to laws regulating communications within the
physician-patient relationship. As the following sections demonstrate,
some decisions suggest that such speech is exempt from First
Amendment scrutiny. Others conclude that it is entitled to First
Amendment protection but disagree about the appropriate standard
to apply.

16. See, e.g., Bailey v. Huggins Diagnostic & Rehab. Ctr., Inc., 952 P.2d 768, 773
(Colo. App. 1997) (dismissing action for negligent misrepresentation against a dentist who
recommended the removal of amalgams in a book and television interview, citing the
dentist’s First Amendment interest in “[t]he expression of opinions upon matters of public
concern”).
17. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 656 (1985)
(striking down Ohio’s ban on the use of illustrations in attorney advertising).
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A. Supreme Court Cases
One of the earliest Supreme Court discussions of the First
Amendment’s application to professional communications appears in
Justice White’s concurring opinion in Lowe v. SEC,18 which argued
that an unregistered investment adviser had a First Amendment right
to publish nonpersonalized investment advice in a securities
newsletter.19 In concluding that the adviser’s publication was
protected speech, Justice White emphasized that the communications
were not made in the context of a professional-client relationship.20 If
they had been, he suggested, they would have constituted “the
practice of a profession” and would not have been entitled to any
First Amendment protection.21 Arguing that “[t]he power of
government to regulate the professions is not lost whenever the
practice of a profession entails speech,”22 he concluded that the First
Amendment is inapplicable to communications made within “the
personal nexus between the professional and client.”23 “Just as offer
and acceptance are communications incidental to the regulable
transaction called a contract,” Justice White wrote, speech within the
context of a professional relationship is incidental to the regulable
activity of practicing a profession.24
Although some lower courts have cited Justice White’s
observations with approval,25 it is important to remember that his
opinion did not command a majority of the Court. Moreover,
although the opinion speaks broadly of the government’s power to
18. 472 U.S. 181 (1985).
19. See id. at 211 (White, J., concurring). The majority in Lowe did not reach the First
Amendment issue because it concluded that the defendant’s activities did not fall under
the SEC’s jurisdiction. See id. (majority opinion).
20. See id. at 236 (White, J., concurring).
21. Id. at 232. As support for this distinction, Justice White cited Justice Jackson’s
observation in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring), that “the
state may prohibit the pursuit of medicine as an occupation without its license, but I do
not think it could make it a crime publicly or privately to speak urging persons to follow or
reject any school of medical thought.” Lowe, 472 U.S. at 231 (White, J., concurring)
(quoting Thomas, 323 U.S. at 544 (Jackson, J., concurring)).
22. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 228 (White, J., concurring).
23. Id. at 232 (arguing that communications are a part of professional practice when
one “takes the affairs of a client personally in hand and purports to exercise judgment on
behalf of the client in the light of the client’s individual needs and circumstances”).
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195, 1217–18 (11th Cir.
2014), vacated on reh’g, 797 F.3d 859 (11th Cir. 2015), vacated on reh’g, 814 F.3d 1159
(11th Cir. 2015), aff’d in part and rev’d in part en banc, 848 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017);
Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042, 1053 (9th Cir. 2013), amended on denial of reh’g en banc,
740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014).
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regulate the professions, it is clear from the context that Justice White
was referring to a specific form of regulation: the power to “restrict
entry into professions and vocations through licensing schemes.”26
Specifically, he argued that, in light of the government’s power “to
ensure that only those who are suitable to fulfill their fiduciary
responsibilities may engage in the profession,”27 the challenged
statute was not unconstitutional “[a]s applied to limit entry into the
profession of providing investment advice tailored to the individual
needs of each client.”28 Nothing in the opinion suggested that the
government has the power to regulate the content of professional
speech without being subject to ordinary First Amendment
constraints.
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions support the view that the
First Amendment applies to content-based restrictions on
professionals’ communications. One example is Gentile v. State Bar of
Nevada,29 in which the Court found that the First Amendment did not
preclude states from disciplining attorneys for making extrajudicial
statements that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will
have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative
proceeding.30 In reaching this conclusion, the Court observed that
“the speech of lawyers representing clients in pending cases may be
regulated under a less demanding standard than that established for
regulation of the press,” but it did not suggest that restrictions on
professional speech are entirely exempt from First Amendment
scrutiny.31 Four years later, in Florida Bar v. Went for It,32 the Court
cited Gentile for the proposition that “[t]here are circumstances in
which we will accord speech by attorneys on . . . matters of legal
representation the strongest protection our Constitution has to

26. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 229 (White, J., concurring).
27. Id. at 230.
28. Id. at 233. But see Paul Sherman, Commentary, Occupational Speech and the First
Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 183, 199 (2015), http://harvardlawreview.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/03/vol128_Sherman.pdf [https://perma.cc/JR5R-DX2G] (arguing
that exempting licensing requirements from First Amendment scrutiny “is hard to square
with the Supreme Court’s long-held view that licensing laws are among the most onerous
burdens that can be imposed on speech”); Rodney A. Smolla, Professional Speech and the
First Amendment, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 67, 106 (2016) (“Even the threshold decision to
require a license is not immune from high levels of First Amendment scrutiny.”).
29. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
30. Id. at 1058.
31. Id. at 1074.
32. 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (upholding a thirty-day restriction on targeted direct-mail
solicitation of accident victims and their relatives as valid regulation of commercial
speech).
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offer.”33 However, neither of these cases involved efforts to regulate
private conversations between professionals and their clients.
Only two Supreme Court cases have directly addressed the
constitutionality of laws regulating communications by physicians
with their patients. The first, Rust v. Sullivan,34 was a challenge to
federal regulations prohibiting physicians in federally funded family
planning facilities from counseling patients on abortion. In a 5-4
decision, the Court upheld the regulations on the ground that the
government is free to limit the scope of services provided by federally
funded programs and to require program participants not to offer
services that go beyond that scope.35 The Court also emphasized that
the regulations did not “require[] a doctor to represent as his own any
opinion that he does not in fact hold” and that the relationship
between physicians and patients in the program was not “sufficiently
all encompassing so as to justify an expectation on the part of the
patient of comprehensive medical advice.”36 However, while these
observations would seem to imply that at least some restrictions on
physician-patient communications could be vulnerable to a First
Amendment challenge, the Court expressly left that question
unresolved.37 Moreover, because the case involved conditions placed
on participants in federally funded programs, it says little about the
standard applicable to restrictions on physician speech in private
physician-patient relationships.
Of greater relevance is the Supreme Court’s 1992 decision in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.38 That
case involved a challenge to a Pennsylvania law that, among other
things, required physicians performing abortions to provide specific
information about the risks of the procedure, the risks of carrying the
fetus to term, the probable gestational age of the fetus, alternatives to
abortion, and the fact that the father might be responsible for child
support payments.39 In addition to finding that these requirements did

33. Id. at 634.
34. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
35. Id. at 193–94.
36. Id. at 200.
37. Id. (“It could be argued . . . that traditional relationships such as that between
doctor and patient should enjoy protection under the First Amendment from Government
regulation, even when subsidized by the Government. We need not resolve that question
here . . . .”).
38. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion).
39. Id. at 881.
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not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,40
a plurality of the Court found that the mandatory disclosures did not
violate physicians’ First Amendment rights.41 According to the
plurality, even though the disclosure requirements implicated “the
physician’s First Amendment rights not to speak,” they did so “only
as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and
regulation by the State.”42
The Casey plurality’s terse discussion of the First Amendment
leaves a great deal open to interpretation. The two cases it cited as
support—Wooley v. Maynard43 and Whalen v. Roe44—are at best only
obliquely related to mandated disclosures by physicians to patients.
Wooley struck down a New Hampshire law requiring drivers to
display the motto “Live Free or Die” on their license plates,45 and
Whalen upheld a New York statute requiring physicians to report
prescriptions for controlled substances to public health authorities.46
Neither of these cases involved governmental intrusions into
physician-patient discussions. Moreover, as Robert Post has observed,
“Exactly how the strict First Amendment standards of Wooley are
meant to qualify the broad police power discretion of Whalen [was]
left entirely obscure.”47
At a minimum, the plurality’s reference to “the physician’s First
Amendment rights not to speak” affirms that physicians’
communications with their patients are entitled to at least some First
Amendment protection. However, the plurality never articulated the
applicable standard of review.48 On the one hand, its use of the word
“reasonable” might mean that such laws are permissible as long as
they have a rational basis, given that the word “reasonable” is often
used as a synonym for “rational.”49 On the other hand, the plurality
40. The plurality concluded that the requirements did not violate the Due Process
Clause because they did not impose an “undue burden” on a woman’s ability to determine
whether or not to carry a pregnancy to term. See id. at 881–83.
41. Id. at 884.
42. Id.
43. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
44. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
45. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 713.
46. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603–04.
47. Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of
Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 946.
48. See Sonia M. Suter, The First Amendment and Physician Speech in Reproductive
Decision Making, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 22, 24 (2015) (observing that Casey “left
ambiguous how to evaluate regulations of professional speech in health care”).
49. See Scott W. Gaylord, A Matter of Context: Casey and the Constitutionality of
Compelled Physician Speech, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 35, 36 (2015) (“[I]n the context of
the practice of medicine, compelled disclosures generally do not impose an undue burden
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made this statement only after having already determined (in the
context of its due process analysis) that the state had a “substantial”
interest in requiring the disclosures50 and noting “the ways in which
the speech requirement was narrowly drawn.”51 In light of these
findings, the Pennsylvania law would have survived even the higher
standard of intermediate scrutiny,52 making it unnecessary for the
plurality to decide which of the two standards it was required to
apply. The most that can be said about Casey is that the plurality was
clearly not applying strict scrutiny in its First Amendment analysis, as
it made no effort to determine whether the statute was “narrowly
tailored” or based on a “compelling state interest.”
The Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in National Institute of
Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA),53 while not directly
dealing with communications within a physician-patient relationship,
sheds light on the Court’s current thinking on the First Amendment’s
application to professional speech more generally. NIFLA involved a
challenge to a California statute regulating so-called crisis pregnancy
centers (“CPCs”), which are organizations that offer a limited range
of pregnancy-related services and exist primarily to “discourage and
prevent women from seeking abortions.”54 The California statute
required licensed CPCs to notify women that the state provides free
and low-cost pregnancy-related services, including abortions, and
required unlicensed facilities to notify women that the facilities are
not licensed to provide medical services.55 A group of CPCs
challenged the statute under the First Amendment and moved for a

and, consequently, are subject only to ‘reasonableness’ or rational basis review under
Casey.”); B. Jessie Hill, Sex, Lies, and Ultrasound, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 421, 432 (2018)
(“The Court’s language of reasonableness, along with its dismissive treatment of the claim,
suggest something like rational basis review was applied to the physician’s free speech
claim.”).
50. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992) (plurality
opinion).
51. See Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195, 1246 (11th Cir. 2014)
(Wilson, J., dissenting) (noting that the Pennsylvania statute at issue in Casey “was limited
to ‘truthful and not misleading’ information” and did “‘not prevent the physician from
exercising his or her medical judgment’ not to provide the information in certain
situations” (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 882, 884)), vacated on reh’g, 797 F.3d 859 (11th Cir.
2015), vacated on reh’g, 814 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2015), aff’d in part and rev’d in part en
banc, 848 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017).
52. See id. (“This analysis mirrors an intermediate scrutiny analysis and shows that the
law in question passes constitutional muster under that standard.”).
53. 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
54. Id. at 2368.
55. Id. at 2368–70.
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preliminary injunction to prevent the statute from being enforced.56
The district court denied the motion, finding that the CPCs could not
show a likelihood of success on the merits.57 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed.58 According to the Ninth Circuit, the notice requirement for
licensed facilities satisfied the “lower level of scrutiny” applicable to
regulations of “professional speech,” while the notice requirement for
unlicensed clinics satisfied “any level of scrutiny.”59 In a 5-4 decision,
the Supreme Court reversed.
The Court began its analysis by stating that most content-based
restrictions on speech are “presumptively unconstitutional” and will
be upheld only if they are “narrowly tailored to serve compelling state
interests.”60 It criticized the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that contentbased regulations of professional speech are subject to a lower level
of scrutiny, observing that “this Court has not recognized
‘professional speech’ as a separate category of speech.”61 At the same
time, the Court did “not foreclose the possibility” that professional
speech might constitute “a unique category that is exempt from
ordinary First Amendment principles,”62 as it found that the statute
would be unconstitutional even if strict scrutiny were not applied. It
characterized the notice requirement for licensed facilities as “wildly
underinclusive,” on the grounds that the state’s interest in providing
low-income women with information about state-sponsored services
applied equally to health centers not covered by the statute.63 It also
found that the state could have achieved its goal of informing women
about the availability of state-sponsored services through less56. Id. at 2370.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. (quoting Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 835,
837, 839 (9th Cir. 2016), rev’d sub nom. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra,
138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018)).
60. Id. at 2371 (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015)).
61. See id. The Court emphasized that “[s]peech is not unprotected merely because it
is uttered by ‘professionals.’” Id. at 2371–72. This was an odd claim for two reasons. First,
the Ninth Circuit had not held that professional speech is “unprotected”; it simply found
that such speech is subject to intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny. See Nat’l Inst. of
Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 839 (9th Cir. 2016), rev’d sub nom. Nat’l
Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). Second, proponents of
a professional speech doctrine have been clear to emphasize that the doctrine does not
apply to all speech “uttered by ‘professionals’” but rather to the more limited category of
communications within a professional-client relationship. See, e.g., Daniel Halberstam,
Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional Status of Social
Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 843 (1999) (distinguishing between speech “uttered in
the course of professional practice” and speech “uttered by a professional”).
62. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2375.
63. Id. (quoting Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 802 (2011)).
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restrictive means, such as public information campaigns.64 The Court
expressed the same concerns about underinclusiveness with respect to
the notice requirement for unlicensed facilities.65 In addition, it
concluded that the justification for that requirement was “purely
hypothetical,” as there was no evidence that women did not already
know that these clinics were unlicensed.66
NIFLA’s implications for laws governing physician-patient
communications are difficult to determine. In addition to leaving
open the possibility that the regulation of professional speech might
not be subject to ordinary First Amendment principles, the Court
noted that, even if strict scrutiny does apply to professional speech,
“[s]tates may regulate professional conduct, even though that conduct
incidentally involves speech.”67 The Court cited Casey as support for
this proposition, implying that informed consent discussions fall into
the category of “professional conduct” that has an incidental effect on
speech.68 It further suggested that this exception to strict scrutiny
might go beyond informed consent to include other regulations of
professional speech “tied to a [medical] procedure.”69 The reason this
exception did not apply to the California statute in NIFLA was that
the law regulated facilities rather than physicians, and it applied
“regardless of whether a medical procedure is ever sought, offered, or
performed.”70 However, depending on how the Court applies this
speech/conduct distinction in future cases, it is possible that, even if
most content-based regulations of professional speech are governed
by strict scrutiny, laws governing physician-patient communications
will remain subject to a more deferential standard of review.
B.

Lower Court Cases

The scant Supreme Court case law on point has left lower courts
with little guidance in cases involving restrictions on professional
communications. The one issue on which there appears to be a
consensus is that laws requiring licensing of individuals who engage in
speech-related professions do not violate the First Amendment rights

64. Id. at 2376.
65. See id. at 2378.
66. Id. at 2377 (quoting Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, Bd. of
Accountancy, 512 U.S. 136, 146 (1994)).
67. Id. at 2372.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 2373.
70. Id.
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of nonlicensed persons.71 For example, circuit courts have rejected
First Amendment challenges to laws requiring licensing of
psychotherapists,72 interior designers,73 fortune tellers,74 and
accountants.75 None of these cases, however, directly addressed
efforts to regulate the content of communications between
professionals and their clients.76 On that question, lower courts have
adopted a broad range of approaches, reflecting dramatically
different understandings of the First Amendment issues at stake. This
section considers those cases, focusing on those specifically related to
the medical profession.
1. Physician Speech Recommending Therapeutic Options
A core function of physician speech is to ensure that patients
have information about the range of therapeutic options available in
their particular circumstances. This responsibility is reflected in the
doctrine of informed consent, which requires that physicians not only
present the risks and benefits of proposed treatments but also discuss
available alternatives that fall within the prevailing standard of care.77
71. The D.C. Circuit, however, has held that the lower level of First Amendment
protection for licensing requirements is limited to occupations involving individualized
professional-client relationships. See Edwards v. District of Columbia, 755 F.3d 996, 1000
& n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (applying heightened scrutiny to a regulation requiring tour guides
to pass a licensing exam on the ground that tour guides “provide virtually identical
information to each customer”). In addition, the Fifth Circuit has held that states may not
use their licensing authority to restrict persons from using professional titles outside the
context of professional practice. See Serafine v. Branaman, 810 F.3d 354, 360 (5th Cir.
2016) (finding that Texas could not prohibit an unlicensed political candidate from
describing herself as a psychologist on her campaign website, noting that “[o]utside the
fiduciary relationship between client and therapist, speech is granted ordinary First
Amendment protection”).
72. See Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psychology,
228 F.3d 1043, 1053 (9th Cir. 2000).
73. See Locke v. Shore, 634 F.3d 1185, 1189 (11th Cir. 2011).
74. See Moore-King v. County of Chesterfield, 708 F.3d 560, 570 (4th Cir. 2013). To
the extent the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in NIFLA casts doubt on the idea that
professional speech is a distinct First Amendment category, the continued precedential
value of the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Moore-King remains uncertain. See NIFLA, 138
S. Ct. at 2375 (questioning whether there is “a persuasive reason for treating professional
speech as a unique category that is exempt from ordinary First Amendment principles,”
but not “foreclos[ing] the possibility that some such reason exists”).
75. See Accountant’s Soc’y of Va. v. Bowman, 860 F.2d 602, 605 (4th Cir. 1988).
76. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis, 228 F.3d at 1055–56
(noting that the law requiring licenses for psychotherapists did not “dictate the content of
what is said in therapy”).
77. See Nadia N. Sawicki, Modernizing Informed Consent: Expanding the Boundaries
of Materiality, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 821, 829–32 [hereinafter Sawicki, Modernizing
Informed Consent] (describing the common law foundations of informed consent).
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In addition to being a legal duty, presenting patients with alternatives
to proposed treatments is considered part of physicians’ ethical
obligation to respect patients’ decision-making autonomy.78
Within this context, many physicians strongly objected when, in
response to state laws immunizing physicians from prosecution for
recommending marijuana for medical purposes, the federal
government
declared
that
physicians
who
made
such
recommendations would risk losing their federal licenses to prescribe
controlled substances.79 In Conant v. Walters,80 a coalition of
physicians and patients brought suit to enjoin enforcement of this
policy on First Amendment grounds.81 A district court found for the
plaintiffs, and the government appealed.82
In affirming the district court, the Ninth Circuit asserted that the
government’s threat to revoke the controlled substance registrations
of physicians who recommend medical marijuana undermined “core
First Amendment interests of doctors and patients.”83 Unlike
licensing laws, which are content-neutral standards for judging
individuals’ qualifications for entry into a profession, penalizing
physicians for recommending medical marijuana “seeks to punish
physicians on the basis of the content of doctor-patient
communications.”84 The court noted that, in a previous case
upholding licensing requirements for mental health professionals, it
had emphasized that the law did not seek to control the content of
therapists’ communications with patients or to prevent therapists
from relying on particular psychoanalytic techniques.85 Here,
however, the law directly regulated the content of what physicians
could say to their patients.
The court was particularly troubled by the fact that the
challenged policy intruded on the normal process of professional
decision-making. It contrasted the blanket policy against
recommending medical marijuana with the Pennsylvania law that had
been upheld in Casey, which excused physicians from making the
required disclosures if they had a reasonable belief that doing so
would have a “severely adverse effect on the physical or mental
78. See id. at 827–29 (discussing the ethical foundations of informed consent).
79. See Administration Response to Arizona Proposition 200 and California
Proposition 215, 62 Fed. Reg. 6164, 6164–66 (Feb. 11, 1997).
80. 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002).
81. Id. at 632.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 636.
84. Id. at 637.
85. Id.
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health of the patient.”86 In light of this exception, the court observed
that the Pennsylvania law “did not ‘prevent the physician from
exercising his or her medical judgment.’”87
The Ninth Circuit also compared the case to Legal Services Corp.
v. Velazquez,88 in which the Supreme Court struck down a statute
preventing legal service organizations receiving federal funds from
challenging welfare laws.89 “Like the limitation in Velazquez,” the
court found that the prohibition on recommending medical marijuana
“‘alter[s] the traditional role’ of medical professionals by
‘prohibit[ing] speech necessary to the proper functioning of those
systems.’”90 The court’s reliance on Velazquez suggests that the
problem with the federal policy was not simply that it interfered with
the rights of individual physicians and patients but also that it
undermined physicians’ ability to conform to the medical profession’s
own standards and norms.
2. Physician Speech with Therapeutic Purposes
While many medical treatments involve drugs or procedures, in
other situations physicians treat patients with nothing more than
words. An obvious example is when psychiatrists engage in talk
therapy with their patients, a process in which the treatment consists
entirely of conversation. Other examples include advising patients on
improving cardiac health through diet or exercise,91 and counseling
patients about nonpharmaceutical strategies for dealing with
symptoms such as insomnia or pain.92 As discussed further below, it
can sometimes be difficult to differentiate between speech that
86. Id. at 638 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883–84
(1992) (plurality opinion)).
87. Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 883–84).
88. 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
89. Id. at 536–37.
90. Conant, 309 F.3d at 638 (alterations in original) (quoting Velazquez, 531 U.S. at
544).
91. See generally Nancy T. Artinian et al., Interventions to Promote Physical Activity
and Dietary Lifestyle Changes for Cardiovascular Risk Factor Reduction in Adults, 122
CIRCULATION 406 (2010) (discussing the role of physician counseling in improving cardiac
health).
92. See generally John McBeth et al., Cognitive Behavioral Therapy, Exercise, or Both
for Treating Chronic Widespread Pain, 172 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 48, 48 (2012)
(concluding that telephone-delivered cognitive behavioral therapy led to “substantial,
statistically significant, and sustained improvements” in patients’ global assessments of
their health); Amir Qaseem et al., Management of Chronic Insomnia Disorder in Adults: A
Clinical Practice Guideline from the American College of Physicians, 165 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 125 (2016) (discussing the importance of behavioral counseling as a firstline treatment for insomnia).
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recommends a therapeutic option and speech that constitutes the
therapy itself.93 Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit in Pickup v. Brown94
found that the distinction between these two types of speech had
constitutional significance.
Pickup involved a challenge to a California law prohibiting
licensed mental health care providers from performing therapies
intended to change minors’ sexual orientation (known as “sexual
orientation change efforts,” or “SOCE”).95 These therapies included
techniques such as “assertiveness and affection training with physical
and social reinforcement” and attempts “to change gay men’s and
lesbians’ thought patterns by reframing desires, redirecting thoughts,
or using hypnosis.”96 Providers who violated the statute could be
subject to professional discipline.97
In upholding the law, the court distinguished the ban on SOCE
from the federal policy against recommending medical marijuana,
which the court had previously found unconstitutional in Conant.98 It
observed that the policy at issue in Conant involved “doctor-patient
communications about medical treatment,”99 whereas the ban on
SOCE targeted a type of medical treatment that just happens to be
carried out through the mechanism of speech. According to the court,
because the speech was primarily “therapeutic, not symbolic,” it did
not constitute “an act of communication” triggering First
Amendment protection.100 Instead, when “treatment is performed
through speech alone,” regulation of that speech constitutes a
regulation of conduct, “subject to deferential review just as are other
regulations of the practice of medicine.”101 The court emphasized that
physicians remained free to discuss SOCE with their patients and to
express opinions about its advantages and drawbacks, as long as they
did not actually perform the therapy themselves.102
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Pickup also clarified—or perhaps
narrowed—its previous decision in Conant by emphasizing that even
93. See infra text accompanying notes 247–50.
94. 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014). As with Moore-King, the Supreme Court’s 2018
decision in NIFLA creates some uncertainty as to the continued precedential value of the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Pickup. See supra note 74.
95. Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1222–23.
96. Id. at 1222.
97. Id. at 1223.
98. Id. at 1219–20.
99. Id. at 1227.
100. Id. at 1230.
101. Id. at 1230–31.
102. Id. at 1219.
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speech about treatment is subject to “somewhat diminished” First
Amendment protection.103 Citing Justice White’s concurring opinion
in Lowe, the court observed that, when speech occurs “within the
confines of a professional relationship,” the purpose is “to advance
the welfare of the clients, rather than to contribute to public
debate.”104 It found that a greater degree of regulation is justified
under these circumstances in light of the government’s interest in
protecting clients from harm. Whereas Conant was concerned with
the possibility that restrictions on speech could interfere with
physicians’ ability to make individualized medical judgments, in
Pickup, the court emphasized the government’s interest in protecting
patients from speech “that is not consistent with the accepted
standard of care.”105 For example, the court observed that the First
Amendment would not prohibit a state from revoking the license of a
physician who “counsel[s] a patient to rely on quack medicine.”106
Shortly after the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Pickup, the Third
Circuit confronted a similar challenge to a New Jersey law prohibiting
the use of SOCE with minor patients. In its decision in King v.
Governor of New Jersey,107 the Third Circuit found that the law was
constitutional but rejected the Ninth Circuit’s view that the law
should be analyzed as a regulation of conduct rather than a limitation
on speech.108 The court relied primarily on the Supreme Court’s
decision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,109 which rejected the
government’s effort to characterize a law prohibiting the provision of
legal advice to terrorist organizations as a limitation on conduct with
only incidental effects on speech.110 According to the Third Circuit,
the decision in Humanitarian Law Project “makes clear that verbal or
written communications, even those that function as vehicles for

103. Id. at 1228.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014). As with Moore-King and Pickup, the Supreme
Court’s 2018 decision in NIFLA creates some uncertainty as to the continued precedential
value of the Third Circuit’s decision in King. See supra note 74.
108. King, 767 F.3d at 226–29.
109. 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
110. See id. at 35–36. Despite finding that the statute implicated protected speech, the
Court upheld it as applied to the kinds of support the plaintiffs sought to provide. See id.
at 36 (finding that the government had sustained its burden of showing that “it was
necessary to prohibit providing material support in the form of training, expert advice,
personnel, and services to foreign terrorist groups”).
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delivering professional services, are ‘speech’ for purposes of the First
Amendment.”111
Despite its conclusion that the prohibition on SOCE was a
regulation of speech and not conduct, the Third Circuit rejected the
plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge to the statute.112 Like the Ninth
Circuit, the court found that speech within the confines of a
professional relationship is entitled to only “diminished” First
Amendment protection.113 The court emphasized that clients typically
have “no choice but to place their trust in . . . professionals,” given
that professionals have specialized knowledge and training that most
clients lack.114 According to the court, to adequately protect
vulnerable clients, states must have sufficient leeway to regulate all
aspects of professional practice, even if doing so may sometimes
involve placing limits on speech.115 The court concluded that the
appropriate standard of review of restrictions on professional speech
was intermediate scrutiny, under which “prohibitions of professional
speech are constitutional only if they directly advance the State’s
interest in protecting its citizens from harmful or ineffective
professional practices and are no more extensive than necessary to
serve that interest.”116 It found that the prohibition on SOCE satisfied
this standard, in light of medical testimony that the practice had the
potential to cause serious harm.117
3. Physician Speech to Elicit Information from Patients
Physicians communicate with patients not only to convey
information or engage in speech-based forms of treatment but also to
prompt patients to share information that might be relevant to
decisions about their care. Such information might include personal
and family medical histories or details about diet, exercise, and other

111. King, 767 F.3d at 225–26.
112. Id. at 224.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 232.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 233. The Third Circuit suggested that this standard was arguably stricter
than the plurality’s approach in Casey, but it distinguished Casey on the ground that “the
regulation it addressed fell within a special category of laws that compel disclosure of
truthful factual information.” Id. at 235–36 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 881 (1992) (plurality opinion)). It concluded that Casey was inapplicable
because the ban on SOCE was “a prohibition of speech, not a compulsion of truthful
factual information.” Id. at 236.
117. Id. at 238.
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behaviors.118 In some cases, physicians ask the same questions to
everyone because they have important health-related implications for
all classes of patients. In other cases, physicians may tailor their
questions based on the patient’s age, gender, or preexisting diagnoses.
In response to evidence of the health risks associated with
firearm ownership, major medical groups have recommended that,
along with other routine questions, physicians ask their patients
whether they have firearms in their homes so that they can counsel
patients about the importance of storing weapons safely.119 However,
following complaints by individuals who perceived these questions as
intrusive, Florida enacted a statute prohibiting physicians from
inquiring about firearm ownership unless they have made a
particularized determination that the information is relevant to the
patient’s medical care or safety, or to the safety of others.120

118. See Tosha B. Wetterneck et al., Development of a Primary Care Physician Task
List to Evaluate Clinic Visit Workflow, 21 BMJ QUALITY & SAFETY 47, 50 (2012) (listing
twenty-six categories of information physicians are expected to gather from patients
during a patient encounter).
119. See Council on Injury, Violence, & Poison Prevention Exec. Comm., Am. Acad.
of Pediatrics, Firearm-Related Injuries Affecting the Pediatric Population, 130 PEDIATRICS
e1416, e1421 (2012) (“The AAP recommends that pediatricians incorporate questions
about the presence and availability of firearms into their patient history taking and urge
parents who possess guns to prevent access to these guns by children.”); Prevention of
Firearm Accidents in Children H-145.990, AMA, https://policysearch.ama-assn.org/
policyfinder/detail/H-145.990?uri=%2FAMADoc%2FHOD.xml-0-547.xml [https://perma.cc/
4YH3-ZW3C] (last updated 2018) (calling on AMA members to “inquire as to the
presence of household firearms as a part of childproofing the home”); see also Steven E.
Weinberger et al., Firearm-Related Injury and Death in the United States: A Call to Action
from 8 Health Professional Organizations and the American Bar Association, 162 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 513, 514 (2015) (“[P]hysicians must be allowed to speak freely to their
patients in a nonjudgmental manner about firearms, provide patients with factual
information about firearms relevant to their health and the health of those around them,
fully answer their patients’ questions, and advise them on the course of behaviors that
promote health and safety without fear of liability or penalty.”).
120. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 381.026, 456.072, 790.338 (West 2017 & West Supp. 2019).
Together, these provisions provide that licensed health care providers and facilities may
not enter information about a patient’s firearm ownership into a patient’s medical record
“if the practitioner knows that such information is not relevant to the patient’s medical
care or safety, or the safety of others,” FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.338(1) (West 2017); must
refrain from asking whether a patient or his or her family member owns firearms unless
the practitioner or facility believes in good faith that the “information is relevant to the
patient’s medical care or safety, or the safety of others,” FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.026(b)
(West Supp. 2019); and must refrain from discriminating against or harassing patients
based on firearm ownership, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.338(5)–(6) (West 2017). Violation of
these provisions constitutes ground for professional discipline, including the potential loss
of a physician’s medical license. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 456.072(u), (nn) (West Supp. 2019).
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In Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida,121 a group of physicians
and advocacy groups challenged the statute as a violation of the First
Amendment.122 The district court found that the statute was subject to
heightened scrutiny because it imposed a content-based restriction on
physicians’ expression.123 It concluded that, regardless of whether the
statute was analyzed under strict or intermediate scrutiny, the state’s
interests were insufficient to justify the limitation on speech.124 In
particular, it found that the State’s reliance on the Second
Amendment was misplaced, as physicians’ questions about firearm
ownership do not deprive individuals of their right to keep and bear
arms,125 and that there was no evidence that the prohibition was
necessary to protect patients from discrimination or harassment.126
The court also found that the state’s interest in protecting patients’
privacy was not a sufficient basis for upholding the law, given the
existence of federal and state laws protecting the confidentiality of
medical records.127
Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court in an
en banc decision,128 but only after a three-judge panel had issued
three separate opinions reversing the district court, each of which
rested on a different rationale. In its first decision, issued in July
2014,129 the majority of the three-judge panel found that the law was
exempt from First Amendment scrutiny because it regulated conduct
rather than expression.130 This decision relied on a broad
interpretation of Justice White’s observation in Lowe that “[t]he
power of government to regulate the professions is not lost whenever

121. 848 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
122. Id. at 1300–01.
123. Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1261–62 (S.D. Fla. 2012), aff’d in
part and rev’d in part en banc sub nom. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293
(11th Cir. 2017).
124. Wollschlaeger, 848 F.3d at 1317.
125. Wollschlaeger, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 1264.
126. Id. at 1264–65.
127. Id. at 1265. In addition to finding that the law interfered with physicians’ First
Amendment rights, the district court found that it was unconstitutionally vague because it
did “not define what constitutes ‘relevant to the patient’s medical care or safety, or the
safety of others,’” and because “what constitutes ‘unnecessary harassment’ is left to
anyone’s guess.” Id. at 1268–69.
128. Wollschlaeger, 848 F.3d at 1319.
129. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 2014), vacated on
reh’g, 797 F.3d 859 (11th Cir. 2015), vacated on reh’g, 814 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2015), aff’d
in part and rev’d in part en banc, 848 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017).
130. Id. at 1217.
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the practice of a profession entails speech.”131 Rejecting the argument
that this statement was limited to licensing requirements, the majority
concluded that any regulation of a professional’s exercise of judgment
on behalf of an individual client is entirely exempt from First
Amendment scrutiny.132 The majority acknowledged the Ninth
Circuit’s distinction in Pickup between physician speech “about
medical treatment” and speech that “was itself treatment,” but it
found that “the line between treatment and communication about
treatment is not necessarily so clear.”133 For example, it observed that
a physician’s effort to help a patient stop smoking might begin with
asking the patient whether he smokes, followed by a recommendation
not to continue.134 Likewise, it observed that “[a] physician’s inquiry
about the presence of firearms in a patient’s home may be viewed as
the opening salvo in an attempt to treat any issues raised by the
presence of those firearms.”135 According to the majority, both the
initial questions and the follow-up they engender are “part and parcel
with the physician’s treatment of the patient.”136
The panel’s July 2014 decision provoked a sharp dissent that,
among other things, criticized the majority for “creating a new
category of speech immune from First Amendment review.”137
Perhaps in response to these comments, the panel took the unusual
step of vacating its decision sua sponte and, in July 2015, substituted a
new opinion138 in which it concluded that the law was, in fact, a direct
regulation of speech subject to First Amendment scrutiny.139
However, the majority found that the regulation of speech within the
context of professional-client relationships is subject to a “lesser level
of scrutiny,”140 given the state’s interest in “regulation of the
profession for the protection of the public, and regulation of the
131. Id. at 1217–18 (quoting Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 228 (1985) (White, J.,
concurring)).
132. Id. at 1222–23 (“We are not convinced that a licensing requirement is the only
form of professional regulation that may validly touch on professional speech.”).
133. Id. at 1224.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1237 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
138. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 797 F.3d 859 (11th Cir.), vacated on reh’g, 814
F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2015), aff’d in part and rev’d in part en banc, 848 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir.
2017).
139. See id. at 886 (“[W]hile the discrimination provision is a regulation of professional
conduct with merely an incidental effect on speech, and thus does not implicate the First
Amendment, the record-keeping, inquiry, and harassment provisions do regulate a
significant amount of protected speech.”).
140. Id. at 892.
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[physician-patient] relationship for the protection of the patient and
the benefit of society.”141 It therefore concluded that the appropriate
standard of review was intermediate scrutiny.142
Citing “simple common sense,” the majority found that the
state’s interests were sufficiently strong to satisfy the intermediate
scrutiny standard.143 The majority emphasized that the statute did not
prohibit physicians from inquiring about firearms if they made a good
faith judgment that doing so was “medically appropriate in the
circumstances of the particular patient’s case.”144 Thus, it viewed the
statute as limiting only irrelevant medical inquiries and concluded
that “[p]roscribing highly intrusive speech that physicians themselves
do not believe to be relevant or necessary directly advances the
State’s interest in protecting its citizens from harmful or ineffective
professional practices and safeguarding their privacy.”145
A few months later, the panel once again vacated its decision sua
sponte and substituted yet another opinion.146 The third decision was
prompted by the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Reed v. Town of
Gilbert,147 which struck down a municipal law imposing stricter limits
on signs advertising religious services than on signs displaying
political or ideological messages.148 Because Justice Thomas’s
majority decision in Reed suggested that all content-based restrictions
on speech must be evaluated under strict scrutiny, the panel chose to
reevaluate the Florida statute using strict, rather than intermediate,
scrutiny. It concluded that, even if strict scrutiny applied, the Florida
statute would still be constitutional, as the state’s interest behind the
law was “compelling” and the law was “narrowly tailored to advance
that interest.”149
Given the panel’s own struggles with the proper resolution of this
case, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision to reconsider it en banc did not
come as a surprise. The en banc court’s ruling largely mirrored the
district court’s earlier analysis. Emphasizing that the legislature’s
evidence of harms caused by physician firearm inquiries was limited

141. Id. at 889.
142. Id. at 896.
143. Id. at 898.
144. Id. at 900.
145. Id. at 898.
146. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 814 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2015), aff’d in part and
rev’d in part en banc, 848 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017).
147. 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
148. Id. at 2233.
149. Wollschlaeger, 814 F.3d at 1186.
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to “six anecdotes and nothing more,”150 the court found that the state
had failed to provide evidence that the statute addressed “harms that
are ‘real, [and] not merely conjectural.’”151 In addition, like the district
court, the en banc court emphasized that other mechanisms already
existed to promote the state’s legitimate interest in protecting patient
privacy.152
The en banc majority expressly declined to decide whether it was
necessary to subject the Florida statute to strict scrutiny, as it found
that the statute failed even the more lenient standard of intermediate
scrutiny.153 However, Judge Wilson, who had dissented from the
original panel decisions upholding the statute, wrote separately “to
underscore the importance of applying the most demanding standard
of scrutiny to this content-based law.”154 Although he acknowledged
that “the Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the appropriate
level of protection for professional speech,” he argued that
“[c]ontent-based restrictions on speech are permitted only when they
fall within a few historic and traditional categories, such as obscenity
or defamation,” and that “[a]bsent from any such category of
unprotected speech is truthful speech by physicians.”155 Distinguishing
“other professional speech situations in which the state has a valid
interest in regulating a specialized profession,”156 Judge Wilson
characterized the Florida statute as a “subversive attempt” to
“silence[] doctors who advance a viewpoint about firearms with which
the state disagrees.”157
4. Compelled Physician Speech
In contrast to the cases discussed in the previous sections, which
involved limitations on what physicians are permitted to say to their
patients, several decisions in the context of abortion involve laws
compelling physicians to make specific disclosures. The abortion laws
are not the only examples of government-mandated disclosure
requirements,158 but so far they are the only ones that have resulted in
150. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293, 1312 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
151. Id. (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994)).
152. Id. at 1314.
153. Id. at 1311.
154. Id. at 1324 (Wilson, J., concurring).
155. Id. at 1325.
156. Id. (citing Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1051–52 (1991) (discussing
cases involving “commercial speech by attorneys or restrictions upon release of
information that the attorney could gain only by use of the court’s discovery process”)).
157. Id. at 1324.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 3–6.
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First Amendment litigation. The circuit courts have reached
conflicting opinions on the appropriate standard to apply.
In two separate en banc decisions in Planned Parenthood
Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds (Rounds I and
Rounds II),159 the Eighth Circuit interpreted Casey to mean that a
state “can use its regulatory authority to require a physician to
provide truthful, non-misleading information relevant to a patient’s
decision to have an abortion, even if that information might also
encourage the patient to choose childbirth over abortion.”160 First, in
its 2008 decision (Rounds I), the court applied this standard to uphold
South Dakota’s requirement that physicians inform pregnant women
that abortion “will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique,
living human being” with whom the woman “has an existing
relationship.”161 Rejecting the argument that the physicians were
being forced to transmit the state’s “ideological message,” it found
that the required disclosure was factually accurate under the statute’s
own definition of the term “human being,” which included “an
individual living member of the species of Homo sapiens . . . during
[its] embryonic [or] fetal age[].”162 The court concluded that it was
“incumbent upon . . . a physician answering a patient’s questions” to
explain that the term “human being” had a particular statutory
meaning.163
Four years later, in its decision in Rounds II, the court upheld
another part of South Dakota’s abortion statute, which required
159. Rounds II, 686 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Rounds I, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir.
2008) (en banc).
160. Rounds I, 530 F.3d at 734–35. Although the court did not specify which standard
of review it was applying, its focus on whether the compelled disclosures were truthful and
not misleading is similar to the Supreme Court’s approach in Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985). In that case, the Court held that states may
require an attorney to disclose “purely factual and uncontroversial information about the
terms under which his services will be available” because doing so is “reasonably related
to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.” Id. at 651. The Zauderer
standard essentially amounts to a form of rational basis review and represents an
exception to the standard of intermediate scrutiny that normally applies in commercial
speech cases. See Note, Repackaging Zauderer, 130 HARV. L. REV. 972, 972 (2017).
161. Rounds I, 530 F.3d at 726 (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (Westlaw
through 2019 Reg. Sess. effective Mar. 27, 2019)).
162. Id. at 735–36 (alterations in original) (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-1
(Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. effective Mar. 27, 2019)).
163. Id. at 735–36; see also B. Jessie Hill, The First Amendment and the Politics of
Reproductive Health Care, 50 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 103, 113 (2016) (arguing that the
court considered this information relevant only because it had “fram[ed] abortion as
predominantly (or at least substantially) a moral decision rather than a medical one,”
thereby “expand[ing] the concept of ‘relevance’ beyond its traditional boundaries in the
informed-consent context”).

97 N.C. L. REV. 843 (2019)

2019]

REGULATING PHYSICIAN SPEECH

867

physicians to state that “increased risk of suicide ideation and
suicide” are “statistically significant risk factors to which the pregnant
woman would be subjected.”164 According to the court, this statement
was truthful because there was evidence that having an abortion is
correlated with suicide or suicide ideation—i.e., that the prevalence of
suicidality is greater among women who have had abortions than
among women who have not.165 Although it acknowledged that there
was no medical consensus “as to whether abortion plays a causal role
in the observed correlation between abortion and suicide,” it found
that this uncertainty did not make the mandatory disclosure
misleading.166 To establish that the disclosure was “unconstitutionally
misleading or irrelevant,” the plaintiffs would have had to prove that
“abortion has been ruled out, to a degree of scientifically accepted
certainty, as a statistically significant causal factor in post-abortion
suicides.”167 In other words, even though some women might interpret
the disclosure to mean that having an abortion would make it more
likely that they would become suicidal, and even though such a causal
relationship had not been established, physicians could still be
required to make the disclosure because the implied causal
connection had not been definitively proven to be false. The court
suggested that, to the extent the required disclosure might be
confusing, it was the physicians’ job to “explain[] [the information]
correctly to their patients.”168
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Texas Medical Providers
Performing Abortion Services v. Lakey,169 involving a Texas statute
requiring providers to display and discuss the results of a sonogram
before performing abortions, relied on a similar approach. According
to the Fifth Circuit, the state’s authority to regulate the medical
profession includes the right to require “truthful, nonmisleading, and
relevant” disclosures, and such requirements do not infringe on
physicians’ First Amendment right not to speak.170 Like the Eighth
Circuit in Rounds II, it relied on Casey as support for this proposition,
describing the plurality’s First Amendment analysis in that case as

164. Rounds II, 686 F.3d at 894.
165. Id. at 899 (“[T]he standard medical practice, as reflected in the record, is to
recognize a strongly correlated adverse outcome as a ‘risk’ while further studies are
conducted to clarify whether various underlying factors play causal roles.”).
166. Id. at 900.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 904–05.
169. 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012).
170. Id. at 576.
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“the antithesis of strict scrutiny.”171 Characterizing the descriptions of
sonogram results as “the epitome of truthful, non-misleading
information,”172 the court suggested that withholding the information
from the woman would be “more of an abuse to her ability to
decide.”173
In contrast, in Stuart v. Camnitz,174 the Fourth Circuit took a very
different approach to the First Amendment implications of compelled
physician disclosures. Stuart involved a challenge to North Carolina’s
abortion disclosure requirements, which compelled physicians to
display and describe the results of a sonogram even if the woman was
“avert[ing] her eyes from the displayed images” or “refus[ing] to hear
the simultaneous explanation and medical description.”175 Finding
that Casey “did not hold sweepingly that all regulation of speech in
the medical context merely receives rational basis review,” the court
found that the proper standard for analyzing content-based physician
disclosure requirements was intermediate scrutiny.176 It found that the
North Carolina law failed that standard because, even assuming a
substantial state interest in promoting childbirth, the law did not
“directly advance the interest without impeding too greatly on
individual liberty interests or competing state concerns.”177
The court’s primary objection to the law was that it was
incompatible with “[t]raditional informed consent requirements,”178 in
which the physician’s role is “to inform and assist the patient without
imposing his or her own personal will and values on the patient.”179
By “[t]ransforming the physician into the mouthpiece of the state,”
the court argued, the law “undermines the trust that is necessary for
facilitating healthy doctor-patient relationships.”180 Unlike the Fifth
and Eighth Circuits, the Fourth Circuit did not find it dispositive that
all of the required disclosures were truthful: “While it is true that the
words the state puts into the doctor’s mouth are factual, that does not
divorce the speech from its moral or ideological implications.”181

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at 575.
Id. at 578.
Id. at 579.
774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 243.
Id. at 249.
Id. at 250.
Id. at 251.
Id. at 252.
Id. at 253.
Id. at 246.
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The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Stuart is notable for its reliance
on professional medical standards. Specifically, it criticized the North
Carolina law as being “in direct contravention of medical ethics and
the principle of patient autonomy.”182 While the court recognized the
state’s role in regulating the medical profession, it asserted that “[t]he
government’s regulatory interest is less potent in the context of a selfregulating profession like medicine.”183 Like the Ninth Circuit in
Conant, the court also suggested that states have an obligation to
respect physicians’ “capacity for independent medical judgment that
professional status implies.”184
II. DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW
Among legal commentators, there is broad consensus that at
least some laws regulating physicians’ communications with their
patients should be subject to heightened First Amendment scrutiny.
However, commentators disagree about not only the appropriate
level of scrutiny—strict versus intermediate—but also the types of
laws to which heightened scrutiny should apply. This part considers
the two primary approaches to the issue that appear in the literature.
The first calls on courts to apply strict scrutiny to all laws regulating
physicians’ communications with their clients. The second argues that
certain types of laws regulating physician speech should trigger
heightened scrutiny—in some cases strict, and in others
intermediate—while others should enjoy no First Amendment
protection at all. After examining the practical and theoretical
problems with both of these approaches, this part concludes by
proposing that all laws that interfere with any aspect of physicianpatient speech should be subject to a uniform standard of
intermediate scrutiny.
A. Strict Scrutiny
Some commentators argue that physicians’ communications with
their patients implicate core First Amendment values. Accordingly,
they argue that laws regulating such communications should be
upheld only if they can satisfy strict scrutiny, the highest standard of
First Amendment review. This standard requires proof that the laws

182. Id. at 255.
183. Id. at 248.
184. Id. at 253.
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are necessary to achieve a “compelling state interest” and that they
have been “narrowly tailored” to accomplish that goal.185
Paula Berg, for example, argues that physician-patient
communications implicate core First Amendment values under both
the “marketplace of ideas” and “personal liberty” rationales for
protecting freedom of expression.186 The marketplace of ideas theory
posits that the purpose of protecting free speech is to encourage the
open competition of ideas, thereby enabling individuals to discover
“the truth.”187 Berg argues that physician-patient discourse should be
protected under this framework because it contributes to both “the
patient’s truth” about the best course of medical treatment in her
individual circumstances and to “scientific and medical truth” about
the best way for physicians to treat similar patients in the future.188
Under the personal liberty approach, free speech is protected because
it safeguards private thoughts and fosters individual autonomy and
self-determination.189 Berg argues that this approach also supports
giving a high level of protection to physician-patient communications,
as such speech is “essential to maintaining patients’ autonomy, selfdetermination, and dignity in the face of illness” and is necessary to
protect the patient’s right to bodily integrity.190
Other commentators who support the application of strict
scrutiny draw on Supreme Court decisions in First Amendment cases
not involving professional speech. Martha Swartz, for example, argues
that the Court’s decision in Sorrell v. IMS Health,191 which struck
down a Vermont statute prohibiting pharmacies from selling
information to pharmaceutical companies about which drugs
particular doctors were prescribing, implies that content- or speakerbased restrictions on speech are always subject to strict scrutiny, even
when the restrictions relate only to commercial transactions.192 If this
is true for restrictions on commercial speech, she argues, it must also
be true for laws regulating physicians’ communications with their

185. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015).
186. See Paula Berg, Toward a First Amendment Theory of Doctor-Patient Discourse
and the Right to Receive Unbiased Medical Advice, 74 B.U. L. REV. 201, 235 (1994).
187. Id. at 231–32.
188. Id. at 235–36.
189. Id. at 234.
190. Id. at 237.
191. 564 U.S. 522 (2011).
192. Martha Swartz, Physician-Patient Communication and the First Amendment After
Sorrell, 17 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 101, 107 (2012).
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patients, particularly in light of “the trust-based nature of the
physician-patient relationship.”193
Similarly, Paul Sherman argues that restrictions on professional
speech should be subject to strict scrutiny in light of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Humanitarian Law Project,194 discussed above in
connection with the Third Circuit’s decision in King.195 Sherman also
relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Stevens,196
which struck down a federal law criminalizing the sale or possession
of depictions of animal cruelty.197 Stevens emphasized that courts do
not have “freewheeling authority to declare new categories of speech
outside the scope of the First Amendment” but instead must ask
whether “the given category of speech has been historically treated as
unprotected.”198 Because there is no evidence that professional speech
was historically exempt from First Amendment scrutiny, Sherman
concludes that content-based restrictions on such speech “should be
treated just like any other content-defined category of speech.”199
The problem with these arguments is that they ignore important
differences between physician-patient communications and the type
of speech that has traditionally enjoyed the highest level of First
Amendment protection—speech on “matters of public concern.”200
Allowing the government to interfere with speech on matters of
public concern by declaring certain opinions valid and others off
limits would be antithetical to the very concept of democratic selfgovernance.201 By applying strict scrutiny in these situations, courts
can prevent the government from stifling free public debate.
193. Id. at 121; see also Martha Swartz, Are Physician-Patient Communications
Protected by the First Amendment?, 2015 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 92, 103 (2015).
194. Sherman, supra note 28, at 190.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 109–11 (discussing Humanitarian Law Project).
196. 559 U.S. 460 (2010).
197. See Sherman, supra note 28, at 191–92.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 192; see also Smolla, supra note 28, at 112 (arguing that applying strict
scrutiny to restrictions on professional speech “serves the valuable purpose . . . of filtering
out government regulation that is not, in the classic sense, targeted at preventing criminal,
tortious, or palpably unethical professional conduct, but instead an attempt to skew the
marketplace of ideas or invade the buffer of confidentiality and autonomy that protects
the integrity of the professional-client relationship”).
200. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451–52 (2011) (“[S]peech on ‘matters of
public concern’ . . . is ‘at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection.’” (alteration in
original) (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758–
59 (1985) (opinion of Powell, J.))).
201. See, e.g., James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of
American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 506 (2011) (arguing that “we all have
a right to formal participation in the political process,” which “includes at least the right to
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However, this preference for government agnosticism makes
little sense when applied to the realm of professional oversight.
Professions—particularly the so-called learned professions, such as
medicine—are premised on the existence of a specialized body of
knowledge, the command of which is a prerequisite for obtaining
professional status.202 Because clients do not typically have access to
this knowledge, it can be difficult for them to independently evaluate
the quality of professional advice, making them vulnerable to
exploitation by incompetent or unscrupulous practitioners.
Professional oversight helps overcome this knowledge disparity by
providing a mechanism for sanctioning practitioners who do not
adhere to the profession’s internal standards of quality.203 While
professional standards are typically flexible enough to incorporate a
wide range of perspectives,204 there are certain positions that fall
outside the bounds of professional norms. For example, there is a
well-established medical consensus that childhood vaccines “do not
cause autism.”205 In light of this consensus, physicians have faced
disciplinary action for facilitating parents’ efforts to avoid complying
with medically recommended vaccination schedules.206
be free from coercive laws forbidding speakers from expressing some particular view on a
matter of public concern and laws that seek to prevent audiences from hearing certain
views because the government fears that they will be persuaded to support some unwise
policy”).
202. See Deborah Jones Merritt, Hippocrates and Socrates: Professional Obligations to
Educate the Next Generation, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 403, 405–06 (2016)
(“[P]rofessionals demonstrate at least three characteristics: they apply specialized bodies
of knowledge, maintain complex educational systems to convey that knowledge, and
impart ethical codes as part of that education.”).
203. See Nadia N. Sawicki, Character, Competence, and the Principles of Medical
Discipline, 13 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 285, 295 (2010) (“As an extension of the
state’s police power, the medical board’s disciplinary authority is aimed at protecting
medical consumers from the harms they may incur at the hands of incompetent or
dishonest physicians.”).
204. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Custom, Noncustomary Practice and Negligence, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 1784, 1812 (2009) (noting that, “in medical malpractice, evidence of
compliance with noncustomary practices, if they reflect a ‘respectable minority’ school of
thought, is not only admissible, but in some states is conclusive”).
205. Education and Public Awareness on Vaccine Safety and Efficacy H-440.830, AMA,
https://policysearch.ama-assn.org/policyfinder/detail/vaccine%20safety?uri=%2FAMADoc%
2FHOD.xml-0-3846.xml [perma.cc/NE9N-NFHL] (last updated 2017).
206. See Tara Haelle, Pediatrician Bob Sears Punished for Questionable Vaccine
Exemption, FORBES (July 1, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tarahaelle/2018/07/01/
pediatrician-bob-sears-license-temporarily-revoked-after-questionable-vaccine-exemption/
#3a66a668ef60 [https://perma.cc/LL6S-QEZH]. To take an example from the legal
profession, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require lawyers to bring forward
exclusively “nonfrivolous argument[s],” FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2), a standard that
presupposes that some legal arguments are objectively incorrect, see, e.g., Ahmed v.
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Because effective professional oversight depends on the
government’s ability to distinguish between right and wrong opinions,
many scholars have argued that the usual presumption against
content-based speech limitations should not apply to regulations of
professional speech. For example, Robert Post argues that, in
professional practice, “we insist upon competence, not debate,”207
which implies that “[t]raditional First Amendment values would seem
to carry very little force.”208 Noting that physicians are “routinely held
liable for malpractice for speaking or for failing to speak,” he
concludes that the regulation of physician speech—including
“sanction[ing] viewpoints that are false”209—is “theoretically and
practically inseparable from the regulation of medicine.”210
Similarly, Claudia Haupt argues that government can
legitimately limit professional speech based on its content. According
to Haupt, the reason for protecting professional speech is to
safeguard the integrity of “knowledge communities,” which she
defines as “network[s] of individuals who share common knowledge
and experience as a result of training and practice.”211 These
knowledge communities have “shared notions of validity and a
common way of knowing and reasoning,” which “limit the range of
acceptable opinions found within them.”212 Thus, Haupt argues,
advice that is consistent with the knowledge community’s views is
entitled to “robust First Amendment protection,” but advice that is
not accepted by the knowledge community should receive no First
Amendment protection at all.213
Recognizing the legitimacy of imposing content-based limitations
on physician-patient communications does not necessarily mean that
physician speech should be excluded from the First Amendment
entirely. It does suggest, however, that strict scrutiny is not the
appropriate standard to apply. Strict scrutiny is designed to make it
difficult for the government to restrict speech based on the content of

Gateway Grp. One, No. 12 Civ. 0524 (BMC), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79386, at *3–4
(E.D.N.Y. June 7, 2012) (imposing sanctions on an attorney for asserting a legal argument
with “no chance of success”).
207. Post, supra note 47, at 950.
208. Id. at 951.
209. Id. at 950.
210. Id. at 951.
211. Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 1238, 1249–51 (2016)
[hereinafter Haupt, Professional Speech].
212. Id. at 1251.
213. Claudia E. Haupt, Unprofessional Advice, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 671, 675 (2017)
[hereinafter Haupt, Unprofessional Advice].
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the message,214 but, in the context of professional regulation, we want
government to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable
opinions and advice. Requiring government to prove that all
regulations of physician speech are “narrowly tailored” to achieving a
“compelling state interest” would unduly restrict government’s ability
to carry out this function, as it would prevent regulators from taking
action where evidence of harm is persuasive but not necessarily
incontrovertible. As Wendy Parmet and Jason Smith point out, this is
often true in health cases, where “empirical evidence regarding the
impact of regulations is seldom complete and conclusive.”215
It may be that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Sorrell, Reed,
and other cases reflect a growing view among the justices that all
content-based restrictions on speech should be analyzed under strict
scrutiny, even when those restrictions do not implicate matters of
public concern. However, the Court expressly declined to reach this
question in its 2018 decision in NIFLA,216 suggesting that a majority
of justices might not be willing to support such an approach.
Moreover, NIFLA suggests that, even if the Court ultimately
concludes that content-based restrictions on most professional speech
must satisfy strict scrutiny, regulations of treatment-related
communications might be subject to a more deferential standard of
review.217 Thus, unless and until the Supreme Court expressly rules
otherwise, there is no reason for courts reviewing regulations of
physician-patient communications to assume that strict scrutiny
necessarily applies.
B.

Mixed Levels of Scrutiny

Some commentators argue that certain types of laws regulating
physician speech are more problematic than others and that these
laws should trigger some form of heightened scrutiny—in some cases
strict, and in others intermediate—while others should enjoy no First
Amendment protection at all. For example, although Post argues that
most content- and viewpoint-based regulations of professional speech
do not implicate core First Amendment values, he believes that
heightened scrutiny should apply in two situations. The first is when a
law seeks to compel physicians to transmit “ideological” messages.218
214. See supra text accompanying notes 200–01.
215. Wendy E. Parmet & Jason Smith, Free Speech and Public Health: Unraveling the
Commercial-Professional Speech Paradox, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 887, 912 (2017).
216. See supra text accompanying note 62.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 67–70.
218. See Post, supra note 47, at 939.
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He argues that such laws should be subject to “rigorous and almost
certainly fatal First Amendment scrutiny.”219 The second is when a
law interferes with “communications involving informed consent”220
by “requir[ing] physicians to communicate information that the
medical profession regards as false, or prohibit[ing] physicians from
communicating information that the medical profession regards as
true.”221 For these laws, Post would apply the standard applicable in
commercial speech cases,222 which is intermediate scrutiny.223
Regarding the first category, Post argues that laws requiring
physicians to engage in ideological speech cannot be justified as a
form of professional regulation, because the transmission of
ideological messages is not part of “legitimate medical practice.”224
Other commentators have echoed Post’s criticism of ideological
speech requirements. David Orentlicher, for example, argues that
laws requiring physicians to transmit ideological messages “exploit
the trust of patients in their physicians,” thereby “corrupt[ing] the
fiduciary relationship between patient and physician.”225 Similarly,
Janet Dolgin argues that laws regulating physician speech can be
justified if they are reasonably connected to patient protection, but
not if they are enacted “in service to economic ends and partisan
belief systems.”226
The problem with carving out ideological speech requirements
for separate treatment, however, is that the concept of ideological
speech is inherently malleable.227 For example, in Stuart, the Fourth
219. Id. at 957.
220. Id. at 979.
221. Id. at 939.
222. See id. at 978.
223. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 249 (2010)
(“[R]estrictions on nonmisleading commercial speech regarding lawful activity must
withstand intermediate scrutiny . . . .”).
224. Post, supra note 47, at 954.
225. David Orentlicher, Abortion and Compelled Physician Speech, 43 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 9, 13 (2015).
226. Janet L. Dolgin, Physician Speech and State Control: Furthering Partisan Interests
at the Expense of Good Health, 48 NEW ENG. L. REV. 293, 342 (2014); see also Jennifer M.
Keighley, Physician Speech and Mandatory Ultrasound Laws: The First Amendment’s
Limit on Compelled Ideological Speech, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2347, 2351 (2013) (“[S]tate
laws compelling physician speech that spreads the state’s ideological and non-medical
message should be subject to strict scrutiny.”); Nadia N. Sawicki, Informed Consent as
Compelled Professional Speech: Fictions, Facts, and Open Questions, 50 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 11, 14 (2016) [hereinafter Sawicki, Informed Consent] (“Informed consent
mandates that require physicians to communicate ‘ideological’ speech are likely subject to
strict scrutiny . . . .”).
227. See Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1284 n.4 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[I]t is
difficult to imagine a standard by which a court could determine whether non-commercial
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Circuit characterized North Carolina’s law requiring physicians to
display the results of sonograms to women seeking abortions as an
ideological requirement because it was designed “to convince women
seeking abortions to change their minds or reassess their decisions.”228
But, in Lakey, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Texas’s virtually
identical requirement was not ideological because it involved “the
purest conceivable expression of ‘factual information.’”229 It found
that any impact the information had on the woman’s decision-making
process would be the result of “her own ‘ideology’ . . . not of any
‘ideology’ inherent in the information she has learned.”230 In other
contexts, however, even purely factual disclosure requirements have
been described as ideological. For example, in his concurring opinion
in NIFLA, Justice Kennedy applied the “ideological” label to
California’s law requiring CPCs to inform women that the state
provided free or low-cost pregnancy-related services.231 The required
disclosure was obviously factual, but Justice Kennedy was troubled by
the fact that it was designed to “promote the State’s own preferred
message advertising abortions.”232 Overall, it is hard to discern any
consistent test for defining an ideological message. It seems that the
label is most often applied after a court has already determined that a
speech requirement is substantively inappropriate, rather than as a
neutral way for distinguishing between different categories of
speech.233
Indeed, virtually all speech requirements could be characterized
as ideological in one sense or another. Although the concept of
ideological speech is often used to describe politically motivated
messages, the literal definition of an “ideology” is simply a “body of

speech is or is not ideological.”); Sawicki, Informed Consent, supra note 226, at 14 (“[T]he
definition of what counts as ‘ideological’ speech is widely disputed.”).
228. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 246 (4th Cir. 2014).
229. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 577 n.4
(5th Cir. 2012).
230. Id.
231. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2379 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The California
Legislature included in its official history the congratulatory statement that the Act was
part of California’s legacy of ‘forward thinking.’ . . . But it is not forward thinking to force
individuals to ‘be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of
view [they] fin[d] unacceptable.’” (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977))).
232. Id.
233. Cf. Ronald H. Silverman, Weak Law Teaching, Adam Smith and a New Model of
Merit Pay, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 267, 293 (2000) (“[W]e commonly reserve
pejorative terms like ideology or propaganda for those value systems that we do not
like.”).
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ideas.”234 The practice of medicine incorporates multiple ideologies,
ranging from the foundational principle of “do no harm”235 to specific
maxims like “treat patients with the least invasive therapy first.”236
The entire doctrine of informed consent can be seen as an ideological
regulation of the practice of medicine insofar as it is grounded in
philosophical views about the centrality of patient autonomy in
medical decision-making.237 Thus, under a broad interpretation of the
concept of ideology, heightened scrutiny could potentially apply to
virtually all regulations of physician-patient speech.
Post’s second category for applying heightened scrutiny
encompasses
laws
that
interfere
with
physician-patient
“communications involving informed consent.”238 He argues that, just
as commercial speech doctrine protects consumers’ right to receive
information necessary to make enlightened purchasing decisions, the
First Amendment should also protect patients’ right to the
information necessary to make informed medical choices.239 Other
commentators have also suggested that restrictions on physician
speech are most problematic when they interfere with the process of

234. See A. Mechele Dickerson, Regulating Bankruptcy: Public Choice, Ideology, &
Beyond, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1861, 1886 (2006) (“[I]deology typically is thought to mean
a common and coherent philosophy, outlook, or shared body of ideas or beliefs or a
worldview or cultural belief system that helps individuals (or groups) generate and inform
their decisionmaking process.”); Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Great Image of Authority, 36
STAN. L. REV. 349, 372 (1984) (“Generally, ideology refers descriptively to the set of
beliefs, norms, attitudes, and concepts held by an individual or widely held within a group
of individuals.”).
235. See, e.g., Katie Page, The Four Principles: Can They Be Measured and Do They
Predict Ethical Decision Making, 13 BMC MED. ETHICS 1, 2 (2012) (“The Hippocratic
injunction to do no harm has been an axiom central to the education of medical and
graduate students.”); cf. Sahreen Malik Bhanji, Health Care Ethics, 4 J. CLINICAL RES.
BIOETHICS 1, 1 (2013) (describing “trustworthiness and honesty” as part of the “ideology
and core values of nursing”).
236. See, e.g., Carl G. Klutke & John J. Klutke, Interstitial Cystitis/Painful Bladder
Syndrome for the Primary Care Physician, 15 CANADIAN J. UROLOGY (SUPP. 1) 44, 48
(2008) (“Certainly, as with any disease that tends to be of chronic nature and requires
continuous or at least intermittent treatment, one main tenet is to apply the least invasive
therapy that affords sufficient relief of symptoms.”).
237. See Sawicki, Modernizing Informed Consent, supra note 77, at 827–29; cf. Ann
Kelly, Research and the Subject: The Practice of Informed Consent, 26 POLAR 182, 188
(2003) (discussing “the ideology of informed consent” as applied to ethnographic
research).
238. See Post, supra note 47, at 979–80. Post acknowledges that his concerns about
inappropriate intrusion into physician-patient communications might sometimes
“transcend the narrow confines of informed consent disclosures,” but he worries that
expanding First Amendment protection more broadly could “threaten[] to restrict the
state’s ability freely to regulate the provision of medical treatment.” Id.
239. Id. at 978.
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informed consent to treatment. Sonia Suter, for example, argues that
“professional speech associated with informed consent is high value
speech” and that restrictions on such speech “require heightened, if
not strict, scrutiny.”240 Emphasizing the importance of informed
consent to autonomous decision-making, Suter argues that
heightened scrutiny is necessary to ensure that physicians and patients
have “sufficient discretion” to engage in an “individualized
dialogue.”241 Suter recognizes that states generally have considerable
leeway in enacting laws regulating medical treatments, but she argues
that laws interfering with the “decision-making process” about
treatment should be subjected to a higher standard because of the
“self-determination and autonomy goals of protecting speech.”242
Yet, while informed consent is undoubtedly a central aspect of
the physician-patient relationship, the idea that there exists a distinct
category of “informed consent discussions,” separate and apart from
other physician-patient communications, is an artificial construct. As
bioethicists have long stressed, informed consent is most
appropriately viewed as an ongoing, interactive process, rather than a
one-way disclosure of information conducted at a particular moment
in time.243 Virtually any aspect of physician-patient communications
can be viewed as part of this process as long as it has the potential to
affect patients’ decisions about the type of medical treatment they are
willing to undergo.
For example, the federal policy at issue in Conant, which
penalized physicians who recommended medical marijuana to their
patients, would not initially appear to involve an informed consent
communication; its purpose was to prevent physicians from making a
particular treatment recommendation, rather than to force physicians
to describe proposed treatments in any particular way. Yet the policy
could also be viewed as interfering with patients’ ability to provide
informed consent to other treatments for which medical marijuana
might be considered a reasonable alternative. For example, a patient
might be better able to assess the risks and benefits of taking opioids
for pain if she knew that marijuana might provide similar benefits

240. Suter, supra note 48, at 22.
241. Id. at 27.
242. Id. at 28.
243. See, e.g., Christine Grady, Enduring and Emerging Challenges of Informed
Consent, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 855, 859 (2015) (noting the “need for ongoing
communication processes that allow the incorporation of changing information and
changed expectations over time”).
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with a lower risk of addiction.244 To the extent the federal policy
prevented physicians from discussing this alternative with their
patients, it could be seen as a limitation on “communications
involving informed consent,” even though the policy did not directly
address the process of informed consent at all.
It might be possible to overcome this definitional problem by
broadening the scope of heightened scrutiny to any laws that prohibit
or compel the provision or solicitation of information about medical
treatment, regardless of whether the information technically falls
within the parameters of an informed consent discussion. Such an
approach would be similar to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Pickup,
which distinguished between laws interfering with communications
about medical treatment and laws regulating medical treatment
carried out through the mechanism of speech.245 However, as the
Third Circuit recognized in King, the Supreme Court’s decision in
Humanitarian Law Project casts significant doubt on the
constitutional validity of that distinction.246
More generally, any effort to distinguish between discussions
about treatment from treatment itself ignores how deeply speech and
treatment are intertwined in the medical context. A growing body of
literature recognizes that the manner in which physicians
communicate with patients has a significant impact on medical
outcomes, independent of the specific treatments provided. For
example, in sixteen of the twenty-one randomized studies reviewed in
one article, the manner in which physicians communicated with
patients was shown to have a significant influence on outcomes such
as pain control, blood pressure and blood sugar levels, and emotional
health.247 Some studies have identified poor provider-patient
communication as a key reason why members of minority groups

244. See Kevin P. Hill, Medical Marijuana for Treatment of Chronic Pain and Other
Medical and Psychiatric Problems, 313 JAMA 2474, 2474 (2015) (finding that “use of
marijuana for chronic pain, neuropathic pain, and spasticity due to multiple sclerosis is
supported by high-quality evidence”).
245. See Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1226–27 (9th Cir. 2014).
246. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 27–28 (2010).
247. John M. Travaline, Robert Ruchinskas & Gilbert E. D’Alonzo, Patient-Physician
Communication: Why and How, 105 J. AM. OSTEOPATHIC ASS’N 13, 14 (2005); see also
Charlotte Blease, The Principle of Parity: The “Placebo Effect” and Physician
Communication, 38 J. MED. ETHICS 199, 200–01 (2011) (reporting that patients whose
physicians adopted a “friendly, tactful and supportive communication style” experienced
“substantial improvements” in medical outcomes, including an average two-day reduction
in postcoronary surgery hospital stay).
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frequently experience fewer benefits from medical interventions than
the general population.248
Several mechanisms have been suggested to explain how
physician-patient communications might influence medical outcomes.
One commentator posits that “[t]he physician’s style of
communication can promote a sense of empowerment among patients
by encouraging them to believe that the situation is optimistic and
that their actions will promote recovery” and that this attitude can
itself engender positive outcomes.249 Others argue that
communication styles affect patients’ sense of connection with
physicians and that this connection “can ultimately improve their
health mediated through participation in their care, adherence to
treatment, and patient self-management.”250 Whatever the precise
mechanism, the existence of a link between physician communication
and medical outcomes suggests that all physician speech is potentially
therapeutic. As a result, the effort to create different standards for
speech about treatment and speech that is treatment is unlikely to
succeed.
Timothy Zick suggests another basis for carving out particular
categories of physician speech for heightened constitutional
protection—the distinction between the “application of general
standards of professional care, which can indirectly regulate
speech,”251 and regulations of “professional-client communications
about, concerning, or relating to the recognition, scope, or exercise of
constitutional rights.”252 Examples of the latter sort of regulation
include laws targeting physician-patient communications about
abortion253 or the right to bear arms.254 According to Zick, these types

248. Gregory B. Diette & Cynthia Rand, The Contributing Role of Health-Care
Communication to Health Disparities for Minority Patients with Asthma, 132 CHEST J.
(SUPP.) 802S, 802S–03S (2007).
249. Blease, supra note 247, at 200.
250. Impact of Communication in Healthcare, INST. FOR HEALTHCARE COMM. (July
2011),
http://healthcarecomm.org/about-us/impact-of-communication-in-healthcare
[https://perma.cc/UVA6-BYTJ]; see also John M. Kelley et al., The Influence of the
Patient-Clinician Relationship on Healthcare Outcomes: A Systematic Review and MetaAnalysis of Randomized Controlled Trials, 9 PLOS ONE, no. e94207, Apr. 9, 2014, at 1, 1–
2 (arguing that “cognitive care”—defined as “information gathering, sharing medical
information, patient education, and expectation management”—is “likely to produce
richer interpersonal interactions”).
251. Timothy Zick, Professional Rights Speech, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1289, 1336 (2015).
252. Id. at 1294.
253. See id. at 1328–29 (“[L]aws compelling physicians to disclose detailed, contentspecific information regarding abortion, or to present ideological messages to patients . . .
ought to be treated as suspect under the First Amendment.”).
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of professional speech regulations “are, and ought generally to be
treated as, regulations of political expression based on content” and
therefore should be subject to strict scrutiny under the First
Amendment.255
However, Zick’s proposal to apply strict scrutiny to all laws
limiting professional speech related to the exercise of constitutional
rights would appear to be foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s plurality
opinion in Casey, which upheld mandatory disclosures related to
abortion under a lower standard of review.256 Moreover, even if his
approach could somehow be reconciled with Casey, it is difficult to
see how it would constitute much of a limit in the context of
physician-patient speech. Given that competent individuals have a
constitutionally protected interest in refusing unwanted bodily
invasions,257 virtually all physician-patient communications can be
viewed as speech related to the exercise of a constitutional right, at
least to the extent they relate to invasive medical treatments the
patient might potentially undergo. Thus, at least in the medical
context, Zick’s proposal to limit heightened scrutiny to professional
speech related to the exercise of constitutional rights might not
amount to much of a limitation at all.
Finally, Haupt’s approach to physician speech also rejects the
uniform application of heightened scrutiny in the context of
professional speech regulations. As discussed above, Haupt’s view is
that the First Amendment protects professional speech only to the
extent it falls within the “range of knowledge that is acceptable as
good professional advice,” as determined by the profession’s own
internal standards of acceptability.258 Thus, rather than applying a
uniform standard of heightened scrutiny to all legislative restrictions
on physician-patient communications, she suggests a sliding scale of

254. See id. at 1327 (arguing that the Florida firearms statute challenged in
Wollschlaeger should have been subjected to strict scrutiny because “what it actually
regulates is a conversation relating to the right to bear arms”).
255. Id. at 1359.
256. See supra text accompanying notes 38–52.
257. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (first citing
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980); then citing Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600
(1979)) (discussing cases that “support the recognition of a general liberty interest in
refusing medical treatment”); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221–22 (1990)
(recognizing that prisoners have “a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted
administration of antipsychotic drugs”).
258. Haupt, Unprofessional Advice, supra note 213, at 675; see supra text
accompanying note 213.
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judicial review, in which “[t]he further state regulation diverges from
professional consensus[,] . . . the more skeptical courts ought to be.”259
However, it is difficult to see how such a sliding scale approach
would be workable in practice. Consider a case in which plaintiffs
challenge a law regulating physician speech, and the state’s response
(perhaps supported by explicit legislative findings) is that the law
simply codifies an existing consensus within the professional
community. Under Haupt’s approach, heightened scrutiny will apply
only if the court refuses to defer to the state’s assertion of
professional consensus and instead independently determines that the
law is, in fact, inconsistent with prevailing professional opinion. Yet,
while there is no mathematically precise relationship between tiers of
constitutional scrutiny and courts’ willingness to defer to a
legislature’s factual findings,260 as a practical matter the two questions
tend to be highly interrelated. In particular, courts are more likely to
be deferential to legislative factual findings under a rational basis
standard261 and more likely to question legislative findings when
applying heightened scrutiny.262 As a result, Haupt’s approach creates
a kind of catch-22: to apply heightened scrutiny, courts must be
willing to second-guess states’ assertions about the state of
professional opinion, but this kind of second-guessing is unlikely
unless the court has already determined that heightened scrutiny is
the appropriate standard to apply.263

259. Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech and the Content-Neutrality Trap, 127 YALE
L.J.F. 150, 153, 171 (2017), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/Haupt_xv7cdx9m.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T3T2-PUNK].
260. See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Rethinking Judicial Deference to Legislative FactFinding, 84 IND. L.J. 1, 10 (2009) (“The constitutional tiers of review . . . are neither a
reliable predictor of judicial deference to legislative fact-finding nor an acceptable guide to
the appropriateness of such deference.”).
261. See William D. Araiza, Deference to Congressional Fact-Finding in RightsEnforcing and Rights-Limiting Legislation, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 878, 921 (2013) (“[W]hen
courts apply the rational basis standard, they do not insist on proof that an actual state of
affairs exists; rather, they are content to presume the existence of facts necessary to
establish the requisite connection to a legitimate government purpose.”).
262. See id. (“As part of its insistence on the least possible intrusion on the protected
value, heightened scrutiny requires that the reviewing court have in front of it the actual
facts of the situation—the government’s actual interest and the real factual background.”).
263. For this reason, Wendy Parmet and Jason Smith suggest that Haupt’s proposed
approach might be better characterized as a form of heightened scrutiny in disguise. See
Parmet & Smith, supra note 215, at 902 n.131 (arguing that “[a]lthough Haupt criticizes
the Eleventh Circuit for concluding that [the Florida statute’s] lack of content neutrality
required heightened scrutiny,” the approach she proposes “can easily be viewed as a form
of heightened scrutiny” to the extent that it rejects “the radical deference to the legislature
that usually marks rational basis review”).
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Rather than attempting to carve out specific categories of
physician speech for heightened First Amendment protection, a
better approach would be to apply a uniform standard of
intermediate scrutiny to all regulations interfering with physicianpatient speech. By requiring proof that speech restrictions “directly
advance the State’s interest in protecting its citizens from harmful or
ineffective professional practices and are no more extensive than
necessary to serve that interest,”264 intermediate scrutiny adequately
protects physicians’ and patients’ interest in open medical
communications. At the same time, unlike strict scrutiny, the standard
is not so demanding that it would preclude legitimate regulatory
efforts to uphold professional quality. The next part of this Article
considers how a uniform standard of intermediate scrutiny can be
applied in a manner that promotes both of these goals.
III. APPLYING THE STANDARD
Virtually all of the lower court decisions discussed in Part I were
decided under intermediate scrutiny, but the results of those cases
were far from consistent. The differences in outcome result from
disagreement about the types of state interests that should be counted
in the analysis, as well as how the strengths of those interests are
appropriately assessed. This part argues that, rather than simply
looking at any interest asserted by the government and then deciding
whether it is “important,” courts applying intermediate scrutiny
should ask whether laws interfering with physician speech are
substantially related to the specific governmental interest in
upholding the quality of professional practice. It further argues that
the assessment of whether a law is consistent with this standard
should generally be decided with reference to the views of the
professional community. Contrary to those proposed by other
commentators, however, the standard proposed here would not
require lawmakers to defer to the professional community’s views in
all situations.
A. Defining and Assessing the State’s Interests
Some courts have upheld limitations on physician-patient
communications under intermediate scrutiny by balancing physicians’
First Amendment rights against an excessively broad range of
governmental interests. In Rounds I, for example, the Eighth Circuit

264. King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 233 (3d Cir. 2014).
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justified South Dakota’s requirement that physicians inform pregnant
women that abortion “will terminate the life of a whole, separate,
unique, living human being” in part by citing the state’s authority to
promote childbirth over abortion.265 In one of the vacated panel
decisions in Wollschlaeger, the Eleventh Circuit justified Florida’s
prohibition on routine requests about firearm ownership in part by
citing the state’s interest in “protection of the Second Amendment
right to keep and bear arms.”266
The problem with this approach is that it ignores the underlying
justification for applying intermediate—as opposed to strict—scrutiny
to governmental regulations of professional speech. As discussed
above, the government should be entitled to exercise greater control
over professional speech than other types of communications to
uphold the profession’s internal standards of quality for the benefit of
clients who lack the knowledge to independently evaluate the quality
of professional advice.267 Given this justification, upholding a
professional speech regulation under intermediate scrutiny should
depend on a showing that the law is in fact substantially related to the
state’s interest in upholding professional quality. If the state seeks to
defend a restriction on professional speech by appealing to other
governmental interests, it should have the burden of meeting the
same standard of strict scrutiny applicable to content-based
regulations of nonprofessional speech.
The critical question then becomes how courts should determine
whether a particular speech restriction in fact promotes professional
quality. At one extreme, it might be argued that if a state asserts that
a limitation on professional speech is a necessary quality control
mechanism courts should generally defer to that judgment—absent,
perhaps, evidence that the state’s quality claims are pretexts for
nefarious purposes, such as restricting politically unpopular ideas.
This argument would rest on the fact that the right to practice a
profession depends on having a state-issued license, and license
holders must agree to adhere to conditions established by the state.268

265. See Rounds I, 530 F.3d 726, 734 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (noting the Supreme
Court’s statement that “[t]he government may use its voice and its regulatory authority to
show its profound respect for the life within the woman” (alteration in original) (quoting
Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007))).
266. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 814 F.3d 1159, 1192–93 (11th Cir. 2015), aff’d
in part and rev’d in part en banc, 848 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017).
267. See supra text accompanying notes 202–13.
268. See Michael S. Young & Rachel K. Alexander, Recognizing the Nature of
American Medical Practice: An Argument for Adopting Federal Medical Licensure, 13
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Because the state sets the conditions under which professionals may
practice, it might be argued, the definition of professional quality is
ultimately within the state’s control.
This view of professional authority seems to have driven at least
one of the panel decisions in Wollschlaeger, in which the court gave
short shrift to the argument that prohibiting physicians from making
routine inquiries about firearm ownership was unconstitutional
because it violated professional medical standards. Specifically,
although the court acknowledged that “[s]everal medical associations
. . . have policies that endorse physicians’ practice of asking questions
and providing counseling regarding firearms,”269 it found that these
professional statements were irrelevant because “Florida may
regulate professional standards of medical care within its borders—
regardless of what medical associations may recommend.”270 As
support for this conclusion, the panel cited the Supreme Court’s 1954
decision in Barsky v. Board of Regents,271 which recognized that “[t]he
practice of medicine . . . is lawfully prohibited by the State except
upon the conditions it imposes.”272
The argument that professional standards of care are ultimately
subordinate to the government’s regulatory authority cannot be
dismissed out of hand. When regulating pure conduct, as opposed to
speech, the government is generally under no obligation to defer to
professional opinion. It seems clear, for example, that a physician who
sought to treat patients with an illegal psychedelic drug could not rely
on emerging professional support of such therapy273 as a defense to a
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 145, 166–67 (2010) (describing the state-based system of
medical licensure).
269. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195, 1216 n.11 (11th Cir. 2014),
vacated on reh’g, 797 F.3d 859 (11th Cir. 2015), vacated on reh’g, 814 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir.
2015), aff’d in part and rev’d in part en banc, 848 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017).
270. Id. (citing Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 449 (1954)).
271. 347 U.S. 442 (1954).
272. Id. at 451 (upholding a six-month suspension of a physician’s medical license for
refusing to produce documents in response to a subpoena issued by the Committee on UnAmerican Activities of the U.S. House of Representatives).
273. See, e.g., Robin L. Carhart-Harris et al., Psilocybin with Psychological Support for
Treatment-Resistant Depression: An Open-Label Feasibility Study, 3 LANCET PSYCHIATRY
619, 619 (2016) (finding “preliminary support for the safety and efficacy of psilocybin for
treatment-resistant depression”); Alicia L. Danforth et al., MDMA-Assisted Therapy: A
New Treatment Model for Social Anxiety in Autistic Adults, 64 PROGRESS NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY & BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 237, 237 (2016) (showing that
MDMA-assisted therapy could reduce social anxiety symptoms and increase social
adaptability); Ben Sessa & Matthew W. Johnson, Can Psychedelic Compounds Play a Part
in Drug Dependence Therapy? 206 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 1, 1 (2015) (examining the
“revisiting of psychedelic drug therapy throughout psychiatry”).
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charge of criminal drug distribution. More generally, while the Food
and Drug Administration (“FDA”) has consistently asserted a policy
of noninterference with the practice of medicine,274 physicians
generally cannot treat patients with drugs or devices that have not
received FDA approval or clearance for at least one indication,275
even if their assessment of the risks and benefits to the patient are
consistent with prevailing medical norms.276
Yet lawmakers do not have unbridled authority to disregard
professional medical opinion. In Whole Woman’s Health v.
Hellerstedt,277 for example, the Court struck down a Texas law
requiring abortion providers to meet the same standards as
ambulatory surgery centers and to have admitting privileges at a
hospital within thirty miles of the facility.278 Rather than deferring to
the State’s own assessment of medical necessity,279 the Court
conducted its own analysis of the benefits and burdens of the
challenged requirements, drawing heavily on the opinions of relevant
professional groups.280 The regulations at issue in Whole Woman’s
Health can be distinguished from ordinary regulations of medical
practice because they affected women’s constitutionally protected
interest in obtaining an abortion. However, the same can be said for

274. W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, 116 MICH. L. REV. 421,
441 (2017) (“FDA has long taken the position—and others have long understood—that it
does not regulate the practice of medicine.”).
275. See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 152–53 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that
drugs may not be introduced into interstate commerce until the FDA has approved them
for a specific use but that, after drugs are approved, physicians may prescribe them for
both approved and unapproved uses).
276. Limited exceptions apply to the use of investigational drugs for the treatment of
serious or life-threatening diseases or conditions in patients unable to participate in
clinical trials, assuming the manufacturers are willing to make the drug available. See 21
C.F.R. §§ 312.300–.320 (2018) (governing FDA’s expanded access program for patients
with serious or immediately life-threatening diseases or conditions); see also 21 U.S.C.A.
§ 360bbb-0a (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-5, 116-8, & 116-12) (authorizing
manufacturers to provide investigational drugs to patients with a “life-threatening disease
or condition” outside the FDA’s expanded access program). However, these exceptions
were created by regulation or statute; as a matter of constitutional law, patients do not
have a right to be treated with drugs that have not received FDA approval. See Abigail
All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 697 (D.C.
Cir. 2007) (en banc) (rejecting terminally ill patients’ assertion of a constitutional right to
access unapproved drugs).
277. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
278. Id. at 2300.
279. See id. at 2310 (rejecting the court of appeals’s conclusion that “legislatures, and
not courts, must resolve questions of medical uncertainty”).
280. Id. at 2312–13, 2315–18 (citing professional associations’ amicus briefs).
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regulations of professional speech, which directly implicate First
Amendment rights.281
More generally, even assuming that regulatory authority
generally trumps professional standards in the area of medical
products or procedures, the logic of such an approach does not apply
to regulations affecting speech. Decisions about whether to allow
patients to use a new drug or other intervention reflect a balancing of
risks and benefits to the overall population,282 as well as policy
considerations like the need to create incentives for manufacturers to
invest resources in conducting clinical trials.283 These assessments
implicate broad questions of social policy about which professional
medical standards should not be determinative. By contrast, as
discussed above, the primary justification for regulating professional
speech is to counterbalance the inherent knowledge disparity
between professionals and clients, which makes individuals
vulnerable to exploitation by incompetent or unscrupulous
practitioners.284 The only way to achieve this goal is if professional
regulations are informed by those who have the specialized
knowledge and experience that laypersons lack—i.e., members of the
professional community itself. In fact, states themselves recognize this
need, which is why regulatory bodies charged with overseeing
professionals, such as licensing boards, are typically comprised
predominantly of members of the regulated profession.285

281. See Suter, supra note 48, at 27 (arguing that regulation of physician speech should
be treated “less deferentially than state regulation of medical care” because “regulating
speech, as opposed to medical conduct, affects information disclosure, which deserves
heightened protection” under the First Amendment).
282. See, e.g., NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., PAIN MANAGEMENT AND THE
OPIOID EPIDEMIC: BALANCING SOCIETAL AND INDIVIDUAL BENEFITS AND RISKS OF
PRESCRIPTION OPIOID USE 1 (2017) (calling on the FDA to “incorporat[e] individual and
societal considerations into its risk-benefit framework for opioid approval and
monitoring”); id. at 397 (stating that the FDA should consider the “broader societal
consequences” of opioid use, including “diversion and the overall impact of addiction on
the health and well-being of patients who develop” opioid use disorder in its risk-benefit
assessments of opioids).
283. See Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Right to Experimental Treatment: FDA New Drug
Approval, Constitutional Rights, and the Public’s Health, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 269, 274
(2009) (observing that allowing patients to access experimental drugs directly, without
enrolling in FDA-overseen clinical trials, “could seriously hamper scientific research and
undermine drug innovation”).
284. See supra text accompanying notes 202–13.
285. See John Lunstroth, Voluntary Self-Regulation of Complementary and Alternative
Medicine Practitioners, 70 ALB. L. REV. 209, 238 (2006) (noting that state licensure laws
“delegate authority to regulate the occupation to the profession itself which then functions
through a board whose members are drawn from the profession”).
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Thus, to determine whether a regulation of professional speech is
reasonably related to the state’s interest in upholding professional
quality, courts should consider evidence bearing on the professional
community’s opinions. Such evidence might include whether the
restriction was developed in consultation with members of the
profession, as well as testimony from practitioners as to whether the
restriction supports or hinders their professional goals.286 This kind of
evidence played a central role in the Third Circuit’s decision in King,
which upheld New Jersey’s ban on SOCE in large part because it was
enacted with professional support.287
In addition to considering the views of members of the
professional community, courts should take judicial notice of certain
inherent attributes of professional-client relationships that exist
independently of the particular subject matter being regulated. For
example, in Velazquez, the Supreme Court observed that “the
traditional role of the attorney” includes “complete analysis of the
case, full advice to the client, and proper presentation to the court.”288
In its decision in Conant, the Ninth Circuit relied on this observation
to conclude that a federal rule prohibiting physicians from
recommending medical marijuana violated professional standards
because it prevented physicians from conveying accurate and
complete information based on an individualized assessment of the

286. Considering the views of the professional community does not necessarily mean
deferring to organized professional groups like the AMA. Unlike in some countries,
professional organizations in the U.S. are voluntary associations with no formal powers.
See Katharine Van Tassel, Hospital Peer Review Standards and Due Process: Moving from
Tort Doctrine Toward Contract Principles Based on Clinical Practice Guidelines, 36 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1179, 1182 n.11 (2006) (“[M]embership in professional associations is not
required for practice, and nonmembers cannot be disciplined.” (quoting John H. Colteaux,
Note, Hospital Staff Privileges: The Need for Legislation, 17 STAN. L. REV. 900, 901
(1965))). Even the most prominent groups, such as the AMA, typically represent only a
minority of practitioners. See Ariel R. Schwartz, Note, Doubtful Duty: Physicians’ Legal
Obligation to Treat During an Epidemic, 60 STAN. L. REV. 657, 662 (2007) (noting that the
AMA represents only a quarter of physicians currently practicing in the United States).
Professional organizations’ opinions will therefore not always represent the views of the
profession overall. In some cases, the views expressed by particular professional
associations may be driven by extraneous factors such as conflicts of interest or political
calculations, rather than a genuine application of professional standards and expertise.
287. King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 238 (3d Cir. 2014).
288. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 544, 546 (2001). Similarly, in Rust v.
Sullivan, the Court suggested that, even in the context of government-funded health
services, laws that prevent physicians from providing complete medical advice might raise
First Amendment problems if the physician-patient relationship is “sufficiently all
encompassing so as to justify an expectation on the part of the patient of comprehensive
medical advice.” Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991).
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patient’s particular needs.289 Similarly, in Stuart, the Fourth Circuit
cited several basic principles of professionalism in striking down
North Carolina’s requirement for physicians to display and describe
the results of a sonogram to women seeking abortions, including the
physician’s obligation to make an “independent medical judgment”290
and “to inform and assist the patient without imposing his or her own
personal will and values on the patient.”291 Restrictions on speech that
do not respect these basic requirements cannot plausibly be justified
as efforts to promote the state’s interest in upholding professional
quality.
Some commentators would go further and require courts to give
conclusive weight to professional standards in assessing professional
speech regulations, rather than merely requiring consideration of such
standards as part of their analysis. For example, Haupt argues that
“[t]he First Amendment . . . should provide a shield against the state’s
requirement that professionals dispense unprofessional advice”292 and
that “the distinction between good and bad advice should be drawn
by the knowledge community.”293 As support for this position, she
argues that under the law of medical malpractice “it is the profession
itself that determines what constitutes reasonable care, and courts
have long awarded deference to the profession in such cases.”294
However, the claim that regulations of professional speech must
always be consistent with the norms and standards of the professional
community ignores the fact that professional quality is a multifaceted
concept that includes both technical and nontechnical dimensions. In
the medical context, technical components of quality relate to
methods for diagnosing, treating, and preventing diseases and
conditions, whereas nontechnical aspects include “the interpersonal
(e.g., communication, teamwork), cognitive (e.g., decision-making,
situational awareness) and personal resource skills (e.g., coping with
stress and fatigue).”295 While professionals’ training and expertise
289. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 631 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Planned Parenthood
of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883–84 (1992) (plurality opinion)); see also Jack M.
Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183,
1218 n.147 (2016) (recognizing “a constitutional interest in the development and faithful
application of professional knowledge”).
290. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 253 (4th Cir. 2014).
291. Id. at 252.
292. Haupt, Unprofessional Advice, supra note 213, at 728.
293. Id. at 705.
294. Id. at 708.
295. Riaz A. Agha, Alexander J. Fowler & Nick Sevdalis, The Role of Non-Technical
Skills in Surgery, 4 ANNALS MED. & SURGERY 422, 424 (2015); see also R. Flin & N.
Maran, Identifying and Training Non-Technical Skills for Teams in Acute Medicine, 13
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make them uniquely qualified to evaluate the technical aspects of
quality, they do not necessarily make them experts on the
nontechnical dimensions. In fact, in Canterbury v. Spence,296 one of
the leading cases establishing the modern doctrine of informed
consent, the court specifically concluded that judgments about how
physicians should communicate with patients (part of the
“interpersonal” dimension of quality) are often “non-medical” in
nature.297 As a result, the court found that the standard for assessing
the adequacy of physicians’ disclosures to patients should be based on
whether a “reasonable patient” would find the information
“material” to her decision, without regard to the professional
community’s prevailing practices or views.298
Moreover, while courts have traditionally deferred to
professional standards in medical malpractice cases, deference to
professional judgment is not absolute. As Philip Peters has
documented, in several jurisdictions, medical malpractice juries are
instructed to make their own judgment about what a “reasonable
physician” would have done under the circumstances rather than
simply basing their decision on prevailing professional norms.299
Similarly, courts evaluating restrictions on physician speech should
have the option of rejecting professional opinion when they conclude
that the professional community’s views do not comport with larger
societal conceptions of reasonableness.300 For example, even if a
substantial segment of the professional community believed it was
appropriate to attempt to change minors’ sexual orientation, courts
still could legitimately uphold anti-SOCE laws as legitimate efforts to
protect the civil rights of sexual minorities.301
QUALITY & SAFETY HEALTH CARE (SUPP. 1) i80, i82 (2004) (identifying gathering and
exchanging information as key elements of anesthesiologists’ nontechnical skills).
296. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
297. Id. at 785 (“The decision to unveil the patient’s condition and the chances as to
remediation . . . is oftentimes a non-medical judgment.”).
298. See id. at 786–87.
299. See Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice
Law at the Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 187–88 (2000) (“Modern
malpractice law is moving slowly away from a custom-based standard of care and toward a
reasonable physician standard.”).
300. Similarly, Parmet and Smith argue that “the ultimate question is whether the
regulation of health-related speech protects health,” not whether it conforms to “the
profession’s own perspectives and methodologies.” Parmet & Smith, supra note 215, at
914. As an example, they suggest that “[a] law prohibiting physicians from urging patients
to smoke by claiming that smoking was good for their health . . . would pass muster even if
the AMA recommended otherwise.” Id.
301. See Ignatius Yordan Nugraha, The Compatibility of Sexual Orientation Change
Efforts with International Human Rights Law, 35 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 176, 192 (2017)
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Application to Cases

Under the approach proposed above, the appropriate resolution
of most of the cases discussed in Part I of this Article should be
readily apparent. On the one hand, the prohibitions on SOCE at issue
in Pickup and King would survive intermediate scrutiny because they
were substantially related to the state’s interest in promoting
professional quality, as indicated by their uniform support among
professional organizations. On the other hand, the federal ban on
recommending medical marijuana in Conant, the Florida law
prohibiting routine requests about firearm ownership in
Wollschlaeger, and the compelled abortion disclosures in Rounds I
and II, Lakey, and Stuart would all be struck down. In addition to
conflicting with inherent norms of professional-client relationships,
most of these laws were opposed by professional medical
associations.302 Moreover, there were no factors present in these cases
that would give courts any reason to depart from the professional
community’s views. In fact, the defendants in most of those cases did
not even attempt to describe the challenged laws as efforts to uphold
professional quality. Rather, in Conant, the ban on recommending
medical marijuana was justified as an effort to enforce the
government’s policy against the distribution of controlled
substances,303 while the abortion disclosure laws appeared to be
primarily intended to discourage abortion.304
(concluding that international human rights law “requires States to prohibit SOCE for
minors as a whole”).
302. In Conant, the California Medical Association submitted an amicus brief in
support of the plaintiffs’ challenge to the federal policy. See Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d
629, 631 (9th Cir. 2002). In Wollschlaeger, the Florida chapters of the American Academy
of Pediatrics, the American Academy of Family Physicians, and the American College of
Physicians were part of the group of plaintiffs challenging the Florida law. See
Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1257 (S.D. Fla. 2012), aff’d in part and
rev’d in part en banc sub nom. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir.
2017). In the abortion disclosure cases, amici supporting the plaintiffs included the
American College of Pediatricians, see Rounds II, 686 F.3d 889, 889 (8th Cir. 2012) (en
banc), and the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the American
Medical Association, and the American Public Health Association, see Stuart v. Camnitz,
774 F.3d 238, 238 (4th Cir. 2014).
303. See Conant, 309 F.3d at 632–33.
304. See Stuart, 774 F.3d at 246 (noting that “the clear and conceded purpose” of North
Carolina’s mandatory disclosure requirement “is to support the state’s pro-life position”);
Rounds II, 686 F.3d at 906 (suggesting that required disclosures might “encourage the
patient to choose childbirth over abortion” (quoting Rounds I, 530 F.3d 724, 735 (8th Cir.
2008) (en banc))); Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d
570, 576 (5th Cir. 2012) (concluding that the required disclosures “might cause the woman
to choose childbirth over abortion” (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 889 (1992))).
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The most challenging case for the proposed standard is the
Supreme Court’s decision in Casey. On the one hand, Pennsylvania’s
mandatory disclosures were similar to those at issue in Rounds I and
II, Lakey, and Stuart in that they were primarily designed to
discourage abortion. On the other hand, the focus of the required
disclosures was the risks and alternatives to abortion, which are
standard elements of informed consent.305 Admittedly, the required
disclosures were unbalanced—they emphasized reasons against
having an abortion without also disclosing the potential benefits of
the procedure306—but they at least were limited to factual information
that a reasonable patient would arguably want to know. Moreover, as
the Ninth Circuit observed in Conant, the law did not prevent
physicians from exercising independent medical judgment because it
allowed for exceptions when the disclosure would have a “severely
adverse effect on the physical or mental health of the patient.”307
Courts can therefore apply Casey in a manner that remains
deferential to professional standards. For example, consistent with
Casey, courts can emphasize the importance of limiting mandatory
disclosures to the traditional elements of informed consent—i.e.,
factual information about risks, benefits, and alternatives—as
opposed to sensational efforts to provoke an emotional reaction, such
as forcing patients to view ultrasound images even when they are
averting their eyes.308 Moreover, courts can insist that, like the
Pennsylvania law upheld in Casey, other mandatory disclosure laws
allow for exceptions in cases where a physician reasonably determines
305. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787–88 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“The topics
importantly demanding a communication of information are the inherent and potential
hazards of the proposed treatment, the alternatives to that treatment, if any, and the
results likely if the patient remains untreated.”).
306. In fact, prior to Casey, the Supreme Court had struck down similar informed
consent statutes in the abortion context for precisely this reason. See Thornburgh v. Am.
Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 762 (1986) (characterizing another
compelled disclosure law as “nothing less than an outright attempt to wedge the
Commonwealth’s message discouraging abortion into the privacy of the informed-consent
dialogue between the woman and her physician”); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for
Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 444 (1983) (striking down a city ordinance requiring specific
disclosures to women undergoing abortions on the ground “that much of the information
required is designed not to inform the woman’s consent but rather to persuade her to
withhold it altogether”).
307. See Conant, 309 F.3d at 638 (quoting Planned Parenthood Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 883–84 (1992)); Haupt, Professional Speech, supra note 211, at 1260 (observing
that the Pennsylvania statute “neither required that the providers communicate this
information as their own . . . nor prohibited the providers from expressing their
disagreement with the state’s policy” and that “there was a provision for physicians to
refrain from providing certain information if they deemed it harmful to their patients”).
308. See Stuart, 774 F.3d at 243.
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that the disclosure would have an adverse effect on the patient’s
physical or mental health.
What are the implications of the standard proposed here for the
other mandatory disclosure laws mentioned in the introduction to this
Article, which have not been the subject of litigation?309 Unlike the
compelled abortion disclosure laws, most of these laws were enacted
at the urging of patient advocates, who were concerned that
physicians were not regularly providing patients with important
information. For example, laws requiring physicians to inform breast
cancer patients about the availability of breast-conserving treatment
options were enacted “at the behest of former breast cancer patients,”
many of whom believed that mastectomies were being overused.310
Laws requiring physicians to tell women if mammogram results reveal
the presence of “dense breast tissue” were enacted based on the
urging of advocates “outraged at the thought of women having yearly
mammograms without knowing that their dense breast tissue could
obscure cancerous tumors.”311 The most recent wave of mandatory
disclosure laws, requiring physicians to offer terminally ill patients the
option of receiving information and counseling about palliative care
and end-of-life decision-making, were the result of advocacy by
terminally ill patients and their families.312
In contrast to the support for these laws among many patient
advocates, mandatory disclosure laws have been met with strong
opposition from the medical profession. For example, when
Massachusetts’s breast cancer treatment disclosure law was enacted,
the Massachusetts Medical Society sought to have the statute
repealed on the ground that it interfered with the patient-physician
relationship.313 Similarly, state medical societies objected to the
passage of laws requiring disclosure of end-of-life alternatives.314
After New York’s Palliative Care Information Act was enacted, an
309. See supra text accompanying notes 3–6.
310. Andersen-Watts, supra note 5, at 203.
311. Alena Allen, Dense Women, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 847, 855–56 (2015).
312. See Jane E. Brody, Frank Talk About Care at Life’s End, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23,
2010, at D1 (noting that New York’s Palliative Care Information Act was enacted at the
urging of the advocacy group Compassion and Choices of New York).
313. Susan G. Nayfield et al., Statutory Requirements for Disclosure of Breast Cancer
Treatment Alternatives, 86 NAT’L CANCER INST. J. 1202, 1206 (1994).
314. Jane E. Brody, Law on End-of-Life Care Rankles Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, June 7,
2011, at D7 (noting that New York’s law was “[v]ehemently opposed by the Medical
Society of the State of New York”); see also Steven E. Weinberger et al., Legislative
Interference with the Patient-Physician Relationship, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1557, 1558
(2012) (opposing, on behalf of several medical associations, “[l]aws that specifically dictate
or limit what physicians discuss during health care encounters”).
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oncologist and geriatrician published an editorial in the New England
Journal of Medicine expressing their sympathy with the law’s overall
objectives but criticizing its effort “to prescribe legislatively what
should be a subtle, intimate conversation between doctor and patient
that often happens over time.”315
Despite the opposition to these laws among members of the
professional community, however, it would be difficult to conclude
that they are not reasonably related to the state’s interest in
upholding professional quality. Requiring physicians to disclose the
results of medical testing, as in the breast density legislation, or the
available treatment alternatives, as in the breast cancer treatment and
end-of-life care laws, is well within the parameters of standard
informed consent doctrine. Unlike most of the informed consent laws
in the context of abortion, these statutes require disclosure of
factually accurate, relevant information that reasonable patients
might genuinely want to receive.
Some commentators have argued that mandatory disclosure laws
actually undermine patients’ autonomy because, while they might
appear to be factual, they subtly push patients toward certain
legislatively preferred decisions. For example, Rachael AndersenWatts has described breast cancer disclosure laws as “morally
coercive tool[s]” that “stem in part from the assumption that
individual women were making an ‘incorrect’ decision when they
chose mastectomy instead of lumpectomy.”316 Similarly, Alena Allen
has criticized the state-prescribed information in some states’ breast
density disclosure laws for “direct[ing] women to ‘use’ the
information provided about dense breast tissue to ‘ask’ [their] doctor
if more screening tests might be useful.”317 By “predetermining for
women how they should use information about dense breast tissue,”
she argues, these statutes “substitut[e] the judgment of legislators for
the judgment of women.”318 Allen also raises the concern that these
statutes could lead to an overuse of supplemental follow-up
screenings in contravention of evidence-based medical guidelines.319
Even accepting the validity of these criticisms, however, they do
not make the statutes unconstitutional under the standard proposed

315. Alan B. Astrow & Beth Popp, The Palliative Care Information Act in Real Life,
364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1885, 1885 (2011).
316. Andersen-Watts, supra note 5, at 203–04.
317. Allen, supra note 311, at 874–75.
318. Id. at 875.
319. Id. at 892.
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in this Article.320 While it would be problematic if the statutes
required physicians to recommend particular medical options to
patients regardless of their own medical judgment, none of the
statutes do that. The breast cancer treatment laws simply require
physicians to inform patients that breast-conserving treatments are
among the available options, without stating that these treatments are
necessarily preferable in the patient’s situation. While the breast
density notification laws do imply that supplemental screening might
be appropriate in some situations, they ultimately direct patients to
engage in a discussion with their physicians. As part of this discussion,
physicians can explain that prevailing medical guidelines do not
endorse additional screening for women with dense breast tissue in
the absence of other risk factors.321 Because these statutes do not seek
to override the physician’s individualized medical judgment, they are
consistent with the state’s interest in upholding professional quality—
even if professional associations do not necessarily agree.
That being said, the fact that these statutes are probably
constitutional does not mean that they are wise from a policy
perspective. It is understandable that legislators would want to
respond to concerns that patients are being asked to make important
medical decisions without a full appreciation of the issues, but
requiring physicians to provide patients with “an additional page in
the hefty pile of papers foisted on patients”322 is unlikely to be helpful.
Research has shown that “even when doctors lavish information on
patients, most patients neither understand nor remember it.”323
Moreover, no matter how well the required disclosures are initially
drafted, they can easily become outdated as medical knowledge
evolves. A better approach would be to encourage the greater use of
interactive “patient decision aids,” which are tools designed not only
to provide information but to help patients sort through the available
options in light of their personal values and goals.324 Rather than
320. To be clear, neither Andersen-Watts nor Allen suggests that the mandatory
disclosure laws are unconstitutional; their arguments are grounded in policy concerns, not
constitutional law. In fact, Allen concludes that “the constitutionality of the density
notification provisions cannot seriously be doubted.” Id. at 891 (“Casey affirmed the
state’s authority to regulate the content of physician-patient communications under the
state’s licensing authority.”).
321. See id. at 892.
322. Astrow & Popp, supra note 315, at 1886.
323. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159
U. PA. L. REV. 647, 668 (2011).
324. According to a Cochrane systematic review, decision aids are “interventions
designed to help people make specific and deliberate choices among options (including the
status quo), by making the decision explicit and by providing (at the minimum)

97 N.C. L. REV. 843 (2019)

896

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97

continuing to enact mandatory disclosure laws, legislatures concerned
about promoting more informed patient decision-making should
consider measures to support the integration of these decision aids
into clinical care.325
CONCLUSION
Laws that restrict or compel physician speech pose special
challenges for the First Amendment because they implicate two
potentially competing considerations. On the one hand, inappropriate
government interference in physician-patient communications can
distort professional practice by preventing physicians from providing
or soliciting information important to patients’ medical care. On the
other hand, because patients typically lack the knowledge necessary
to independently evaluate the quality of professional practice, the
public relies on the government to ensure that practitioners uphold
professional norms. To fulfill this mission, the government necessarily
must make judgments about the opinions and advice that physicians
express.
To account for both of these considerations, this Article calls on
courts to subject restrictions on physician-patient communications to
a uniform standard of intermediate scrutiny, with a specific focus on
whether the restrictions directly advance the state’s interest in
upholding the quality of professional practice. This approach is
rigorous enough to protect physicians’ and patients’ interest in open
communication without being so demanding that it precludes
legitimate regulatory efforts to uphold professional quality. The
proposed uniform standard would bring clarity to an area of law that
has been marked by considerable confusion, without introducing the

information on the options and outcomes relevant to a person’s health status as well as
implicit methods to clarify values.” DAWN STACEY ET AL., DECISION AIDS FOR PEOPLE
FACING HEALTH TREATMENT OR SCREENING DECISIONS (REVIEW) 8 (Cochrane
Consumers & Commc’n Grp. ed., 2017). The review notes that decision aids may include
information on the disease/condition; costs associated with options; probabilities
of outcomes tailored to personal health risk factors; an explicit values clarification
exercise; information on others’ opinions; a personalized recommendation on the
basis of clinical characteristics and expressed preferences; and guidance or
coaching in the steps of making and communicating decisions with others.
Id. at 11.
325. See generally Thaddeus Mason Pope, Certified Patient Decision Aids: Solving
Persistent Problems with Informed Consent Law, 45 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 12 (2017) (calling
for efforts to incentivize the use of patient decision aids, including the creation of
independent certification or credentialing processes).
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practical and theoretical problems raised by proposals for variable
standards of review.

97 N.C. L. REV. 843 (2019)

898

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97

